

By DANIEL T. CANFIELD

Army Heritage Museum Collection

Winfield Scott's 1847 Mexico City Campaign as a

MODEL *for* FUTURE WAR



Much work remained for General Winfield Scott even after his victorious arrival in Mexico City on September 14, 1847

Our fixation with conventional battle tends to undervalue the increasing potential of stability operations to decide the political outcomes of military campaigns and clouds our perceptions regarding both the purpose and utility of force.¹ This article uses an abbreviated examination of Winfield Scott's Mexico City campaign to provide perspectives on both the evolving character of warfare and the preeminent challenge confronting America's contemporary operational planners—that is, how to translate ascendancy on the conventional battlefield into achievable and enduring political success. While not dismissing the possibility of traditional, high-intensity, interstate warfare, this article argues that both the character and conduct of America's future conflicts will, in all likelihood, more closely resemble those of Scott's campaign than the black and white political and military paradigms of a bygone era where industrialized nation-states waged near-total wars of annihilation.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel T. Canfield, USMC, wrote this essay while a student at the School of Advanced Warfighting of the Marine Corps University. It won the Strategy Research Paper category of the 2009 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.

DOD (Lou Comegna)



Soldiers drive M-1A1 Abrams tank in victory parade honoring coalition forces of Operation Desert Storm

If the United States hopes to consummate military success with enduring political victory in the 21st century, it will need to reconcile the American way of war with the realities of the contemporary operating environment. While offering no clairvoyant panacea, Scott's campaign provides valuable perspective on how to do so. Operating 156 years before the American invasion of Iraq, Scott prosecuted a bold and imaginative campaign that carefully balanced military means with political ends. His skillful integration of anti-guerrilla, stability, and high-intensity combat operations precluded the eruption of a widespread, religious-based insurgency and consummated his tactical victories with enduring political success. In the future, as in the past, it will not be enough to simply destroy or defeat the enemy's armed forces; the American military will have to be able and ready to win the peace within the construct of an overarching campaign design focused on securing a definitive political, not just military, victory.

Future Conflicts

In the warm afterglow of Operation Desert Storm, our infatuation with technology and its seemingly unbounded potential to revolutionize armed conflict fueled illusions of military supremacy. In reality, however, Desert Storm did not cement our invincibility; it only demonstrated to our adversaries that the means and methods for confronting the United States would have to change. As

9/11 and our protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have so painfully illustrated, we cannot expect our enemies to play to our strengths or otherwise conform to our notions of warfare. Rather, they will continue to develop and utilize means that exploit our critical vulnerabilities and give them the best chance to win. With a joint force so dominant in the conventional application of force, do we really think our current or future adversaries will do us the favor of engaging in a traditional combined arms contest?

Wars and military forces are reflections of the societies and cultures that produce them.² While technology, firepower, and the relentless quest to destroy an adversary's armed forces won the battles of the 20th century, they may not, in and of themselves, be enough to win the wars of the 21st century. In many ways, the evolution of the character of warfare could be seen as unwinding in the aftermath of the apogee of World War II and the introduction of nuclear weapons. One only need look at the decidedly mixed record of conventionally superior forces in the post-World War II era for evidence of this counterintuitive phenomenon. The apparent decoupling of traditional military force from the ability to achieve enduring political success is a function of an increasingly proliferated, politically complex, and globally integrated world. These trends will only accelerate in the years ahead. The preeminent challenge for American defense planners, therefore, will be to reconcile an American

way of war that is almost totally predicated on the conventional application of combat power directed at the destruction of an adversary's armed forces with the reality that our future opponents, fighting among their own people and buoyed by increasingly sophisticated technical capabilities, will turn to a hybrid combination of regular and irregular methods to secure a definitive political rather than a military victory.

Given the distinct possibility of conflict in places such as Iran, Pakistan, Cuba, Venezuela, sub-Saharan Africa, or, lest we forget, the Korean Peninsula, we should expect America's future wars to more closely resemble the Southern Campaign in the American Revolution, albeit from the British perspective, or Scott's drive on Mexico City rather than the tidy and concise military and political paradigms of a bygone era when industrialized nation-states waged near-total wars of annihilation. Our future commanders will be called on to do much more than simply defeat an adversary's armed forces; they will also be expected to operate among a hostile or ambivalent population whose political will to fight does not necessarily reside in the army or the state. For American military power to

the decoupling of traditional military force from the ability to achieve enduring political success is a function of an increasingly proliferated, politically complex, and globally integrated world

be decisive, it will have to do much more than fight its way in. It will, in all likelihood, also need to be capable of winning the peace by rapidly securing the local population, establishing acceptable levels of political legitimacy, and ensuring American war aims and long-term political objectives are achieved amid the social chaos inherent in the wake of any sizable military intervention. Ironically, the way ahead may look quite similar to the not-too-distant past.

Back to the Future

Through a unique combination of politics, geography, and circumstance, America's Manifest Destiny collided with Mexico during the middle of the 19th century.³ In January 1846, President James K. Polk ordered

U.S. ground forces, under the command of Zachary Taylor, to take up positions along the Rio Grande, while Commodore David Conner's home squadron, based out of New Orleans, established a naval cordon around Veracruz. These deliberate provocations, designed to exert political pressure on the Mexican government, proved problematic. The President believed that the United States could obtain the territorial concessions it sought through the combination of limited military coercion and continued diplomacy. This view, however, significantly underestimated Mexican resolve and was based on an incomplete comprehension of Mexican history, culture, and politics.⁴

In 1846, Mexico appeared to be a weak and failing state. Nearly three centuries of Spanish occupation and a bitter war of independence left its society stratified and politically divided. The government was bankrupt, plagued by inefficiency and corruption, and generally incapable of exercising sovereignty within its northern provinces.⁵ Any illusion of a cheap or bloodless victory, however, was shattered on April 25 when Mexican forces,

ment would acquiesce in the face of mounting U.S. pressure.

By November 1846, however, it became apparent that the administration's efforts to obtain a negotiated peace had failed. Taylor's campaign, though tactically successful, was politically indecisive. Worse, the President

*Taylor's campaign, though
tactically successful, was
politically indecisive*

faced trouble at home.⁶ Growing domestic unrest and apprehensions about the desultory conduct of an unpopular war resulted in a stunning political rebuke during the November 1846 congressional elections.⁷ A frustrated and increasingly unpopular President grudgingly turned to Winfield Scott. As the Nation's senior military officer, Scott clearly understood the dangers of military indecision to the Republic: "A little war—a war prosecuted with inadequate means or vigor—is a greater evil than a big war. It discredits the party possessed of superior means; it exhausts her

finances, exhausts her enthusiasms, and generally ends in a failure of all the objects proposed."⁸ Yet the general's military advice had theretofore been muted by an administration determined to win the war on the cheap and a President suspicious of Scott's politics and future ambitions.⁹

Throughout the summer of 1846, Scott lobbied the Secretary of War, William Marcy, for permission to conduct an amphibious landing at Veracruz, followed by a rapid march on Mexico City.¹⁰ By late October, the general formally submitted the first of two reports describing his operational concept in detail.¹¹ While Scott's first letter focused on the seizure of Veracruz, his second, dated November 12, concentrated on the justification and conduct of a subsequent overland drive on the Mexican capital. Realizing that "to compel a people, singularly obstinate, to sue for peace,

it is absolutely necessary, as the sequel in this case showed, to strike, effectively, at the vitals of the nation," Scott sought to avoid any further protraction of hostilities by threatening the very heart of the Mexican regime.¹²

In late November, with Taylor's forces confronting an increasingly violent guerrilla war in northern Mexico and political pressure mounting at home, the President approved Scott's plan and placed him in command of the forthcoming expedition. After a winter of hurried preparation, Scott and his naval counterpart, Commodore David Conner, put three U.S. divisions ashore at Collado Beach, 2 miles south of Veracruz, on March 9, 1847.¹³ This remarkable feat of seamanship and inter-service cooperation culminated on March 29, 1847, when the city's beleaguered defenders capitulated after an abbreviated siege. With Veracruz now in American hands, Scott focused his attention on the civil population. Being aware of Napoleon's difficulties in Spain and realizing that the inherent religious and cultural differences between the victors and the vanquished provided fertile ground for insurgency, the general undertook a deliberate campaign to mitigate the threat of guerrilla warfare breaking out in the wake of American occupation. Scott immediately issued a formal proclamation to the Mexican people:

*Americans are not your enemies, but only the enemies of those who misgoverned you and brought about this unnatural war. To the peaceable inhabitants, and to your church, which is respected by the government, laws, and people in all parts of our country, we are friends.*¹⁴

More importantly, the general reinforced words with decisive action. Scott moved quickly to impose order on the local population and ensure the discipline of his own troops. He instituted martial law, employed local laborers to clean and repair the city, opened the port to foreign trade, installed one of his division commanders as military governor, and reopened the city's shops. The general also made unprecedented overtures to local religious leaders. American troops were required to salute Catholic priests. Scott, himself a devout Protestant, took the unprecedented step of attending Catholic Mass with the newly installed civil governor and their combined staffs.¹⁵ In retrospect, Scott's astute handling of the civil population remains one of the least appreciated aspects of the campaign. It was also one of the



Mexican troops ambushed a squad of U.S. Dragoons, killing 14 Americans, April 1846

under the command of General Mariano Arista, attacked Taylor's army north of the Rio Grande. Though surprised, American forces quickly regained the initiative and eventually pursued Arista's defeated army deep into Mexican territory. Taylor's campaign culminated in late September at the Battle of Monterrey. Though seemingly victorious, the Americans found themselves bogged down in bloody urban combat while operating at the end of a dangerously extended overland supply route. Even at this late hour, Polk still clung to the belief that the Mexican govern-

most important. Keenly aware that he would be waging war among the Mexican people, Scott realized he needed their support or, at the very least, their ambivalence, if he harbored any desire to obtain U.S. war aims.

On April 2, Scott's intrepid and undermanned army boldly turned its back on the sea and raced for Jalapa (elevation 4,680 feet), a small but important town located 74 miles inland, just above the Yellow Fever belt. On April 18, Scott's 8,500 effectives shattered Santa Anna's well entrenched 12,000-man advance guard at Cerro Gordo. With the road to Jalapa now open, Scott pursued the remnants of Santa Anna's army deep into central Mexico. On May 15, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, under the command of Brigadier General William Worth, entered Puebla (elevation 7,091 feet, population 80,000) without a fight. Scott's success, however, proved precarious. He did not have enough men to secure his



U.S. forces land at Veracruz, 1847

Library of Congress (Nathaniel Currier)

lifeline to the sea. Forced to detach troops in order to garrison Veracruz, Jalapa, and now Puebla, he faced guerrilla bands that operated with impunity in the hinterland between outposts. With his supply line virtually severed and Santa Anna's main body lurking somewhere to his front, Scott simply could go no farther. He spent the next 2 months covertly prosecuting anti-guerrilla operations and attempting to resupply his ragged army while he desperately awaited additional troops.¹⁶

By the first week of August, Scott's reinforcements finally arrived after fighting their way up from the coast, but they only managed to bring his effective strength up to 10,738.¹⁷ Nevertheless, on August 7, Scott resumed his advance on Mexico City. By August 10, only a small garrison at Puebla, left behind to care for the sick and wounded, linked Scott's army to the sea. Initially, the march went unchecked. The Americans advanced to Rio Frio (elevation 10,000 feet) and peered down on the picturesque mountain valley that housed the fabled Halls of Montezuma. Santa Anna, however,

had not been idle; he organized 30,000 men for defense of the capital. Scott skillfully maneuvered his army to the south of the city, avoiding a direct assault along the main avenue of approach, and defeated Santa Anna at Contreras and Churubusco on August 20. After an unsuccessful armistice, Scott seized a foothold on the outskirts of the Mexican capital at Molino del Rey on September 8. Less than a week later, his relentless drive on Mexico City culminated in a crescendo of vicious urban combat. On September 13, Scott's army, now down to just 7,000 effectives, pierced the city's inner defenses and seized the fortress of Chapultepec.¹⁸

Despite Scott's seemingly victorious entrance into the capital on September 14, his work remained far from complete. Though Mexican forces evacuated the city on September 13, Santa Anna had emptied the city's jails prior to his departure. The release of thousands of prisoners combined with a substantial number of disaffected residents fueled an explosion of violence directed against the Americans. As he had done throughout the campaign, Scott moved quickly to restore civil order. Martial law was immediately instituted. Sharpshooters posted throughout the city shot any Mexican brandishing a weapon. Structures used by insurgents, particularly snipers, were summarily leveled by U.S. artillery fire. Additionally, Scott insisted that Mexican lawmakers help restore order, threatening to sack the city unless resistance ceased.¹⁹ Eventually, a tense calm settled over the capital, but Scott now faced his most formidable problem: how to achieve a satisfactory political endstate, which was, after all, the *raison d'être* for the military campaign in the first place.

The general never intended to completely destroy the Mexican army or depose the government. He realized, quite pragmatically, that if he did so, social chaos would reign, and there would be no one left to negotiate with.²⁰ Ironically, Scott, now at the zenith of his martial success, was also the most vulnerable. Down to just 7,000 effectives, virtually cut off from the sea, and operating 300 miles inland, he faced the daunting prospect of overseeing the installation of a new government and preventing the outbreak of large-scale guerrilla warfare while attempting to occupy and govern a potentially hostile population of 7 million people.²¹ Paradoxically, Scott's aggressive and adroit implementation of sound civil-military policies in the wake of his tactical victories, not

the conventional defeat of Santa Anna's army, proved decisive.²² The policies also reflected Scott's genius and bore witness to his intuitive appreciation of the complex military, political, and cultural problems confronting the United States in Mexico.

Enduring Relevance

Fourteen years before the American Civil War, the United States prosecuted a bold and imaginative expeditionary campaign that achieved decisive political results. In many ways, it still serves as a model of American operational art.²³ Operating over vast distances in a foreign culture, and dwarfed by a potentially hostile population, the American military confronted and overcame a number of complex problems. Scott, ably assisted by his naval counterpart, Commodore Conner, expertly planned and conducted America's first large-scale amphibious assault, seizing the strategic port of Veracruz with surprising speed and at little cost.²⁴ He then turned his back on the sea and marched his undermanned army nearly 300 miles inland across inhospitable terrain. Operating over an extended and dangerously exposed supply line

the release of thousands of prisoners combined with a substantial number of disaffected residents fueled an explosion of violence directed against the Americans

that was tenuously tied to the sea, Scott won five major battles against numerically superior and entrenched opponents.

With just 7,000 men, Scott seized and occupied Mexico City, a hostile capital of 200,000 inhabitants, and then proceeded to govern the people in such a politically astute way as to prevent a widespread guerrilla war from erupting. Working hand in glove with the President's personal envoy, Nicholas Trist, Scott oversaw the installation of a new government, prosecuted an effective counterinsurgency campaign, and helped negotiate a treaty that obtained U.S. war aims.²⁵ His success, however, was neither predestined nor foreordained; it was the product of imagination anchored on the bedrock of reality, boldness tempered with judgment, and determined leadership that understood the relationship between military means and political ends.²⁶


Scott's campaign provides valuable perspective on the difficulties associated with projecting expeditionary power inland, conducting maneuver warfare from the sea, and facing the cruel realities of urban combat. It also offers keen insight into the challenges of military occupation, counterinsurgency and stability operations among a foreign culture, and campaign design.²⁷ With the clairvoyance of hindsight, the architects of Iraq, both civilian and military, would have been much better off reflecting on the planning and execution of Scott's campaign as opposed to attempting to emulate the military and political paradigms of *Desert Storm* or World War II. Predicting the future remains problematic. Scott's campaign, however, not only represents an illuminating window into our past, but may also provide an intriguing glimpse into our future.

Model for Design

Future campaign planners will likely encounter many of the same problems and complexities that confronted Scott and his staff in Mexico. No matter the character or location of any future conflict, the U.S. military will have to get there first. The joint force will require rapid augmentation from the Reserve Component, fight a long way from the continental United States, and be sustained, at least initially, from the sea. This will require sizable and sustainable expeditionary power projection. Once U.S. forces arrive in theater, they will likely encounter a shrewd and determined enemy

future campaign planners will likely encounter many of the same problems and complexities that confronted Scott and his staff in Mexico

employing a hybrid combination of conventional and irregular threats. American ground forces will be outnumbered on most future battlefields and will almost certainly find themselves dwarfed by an ambivalent or potentially hostile indigenous population. Our future commanders will be called on to win quickly at the lowest possible cost in life and treasure. To do so, however, we must, no matter how begrudgingly, reach a prescient appreciation of how our future adversaries will actually fight.



Library of Congress (Nathaniel Currier)

Reconciling the American Way of War

The United States faces a labyrinth of emerging strategic challenges.²⁸ Confronted with the reality of an uncertain future, it would be dangerous to dismiss or overweigh one form of warfare over the other. Yet it will not be enough to simply field a “balanced” joint force capable of operating across the range of military operations. Rather, the leaders of that force must know how to employ it. Unfortunately, rather than adapting to our opponents’ unpleasant propensity to wage irregular warfare, the United States remains intellectually committed to refighting, albeit with 21st-century precision, World War II. Though much progress has been made, we continue to field an expensive and wonderfully equipped joint force that is, in reality, more attuned to confronting our friends and allies than actually fighting the Nation’s current and future adversaries.²⁹ More importantly, the way we think about armed conflict—the so-called American way of war—remains dangerously overweighted toward the conventional.³⁰ Writing nearly 40 years ago, Russell Weigley not only ominously foreshadowed the nadir of America’s tragic involvement in Vietnam, but also prophetically described the fundamental problem confronting us today:

The twentieth-century United States has not adjusted easily to involvement in irregular war. Our immense wealth and productivity, our

great resources of manpower, and our national conviction that war is an abnormal condition, completely distinct from peace, and a condition which should be terminated quickly in a clear-cut decision, all equipped us admirably to fight and win the two world wars. But they do not fit us so well for limited wars in climate and terrain where massive military power can be in some ways a liability, where victory itself is almost indefinable, and where enemies fight elusively and with methods so thoroughly opposed to conventional rules of war that many of the textbook principles for its conduct are stood on their heads and bring only boomerang results.³¹

Despite Vietnam, Beirut, Mogadishu, 9/11, and our prolonged struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American military has yet to institutionalize the hard-won lessons of counterinsurgency or reconcile the competing theories of regular and irregular warfare. Our mental toolkit remains strangely devoid of anything save an oversized hammer that is increasingly out of place in a 21st-century world. Rather than expending valuable intellectual energy renaming old ideas, we should carefully consider how to synthesize the competing theories and styles of warfare within a new American way of war that imbues our commanders, operational planners, and warfighting organizations with the flexibility of mind to prosecute regular and irregular operations

simultaneously in pursuit of achievable and enduring political goals.

We need to stop thinking, planning, and acting as if there were two separate and distinct wars: a conventional one fought with heavy maneuver forces governed by the intellectual auspices of AirLand Battle, and an unconventional one fought with "special" or "general purpose forces" employing counterinsurgency techniques.³² While contemporary defense planners grapple with the seemingly dichotomous nature of combat instead of stability operations, the reality, as Scott's exploits so clearly illustrate, is that current and future practitioners of American operational art will likely need to do both *simultaneously* if they wish to achieve enduring political success. Perhaps the real legacy of Iraq is not the obvious conclusion that an ounce of insurgency prevention, properly integrated and employed before, during, and immediately after "combat" operations, is worth a pound of military cure, but rather the sublime realization that in an age of limited war, the American military may have to do it again—against an even more determined and capable enemy.

Admittedly, the selective use of history is dangerous, but the similarities between the character and conduct of Scott's campaign and those of America's contemporary and most likely future battlefields are striking and simply too important to ignore.³³ The world and the conduct of warfare are evolving. The American military must anticipate and adapt to the realities of the world we actually live in, not the one we want it to be. While our shallow focus on the destruction of the enemy's armed forces served us well in the age of industrialized, near-total war, it may become a liability in a future world of limited wars where the lines between regular and irregular warfare will continue to blur. If the United States hopes to consummate military success with enduring political "victory" in the 21st century, it will need to reconcile the American way of war with the realities of the contemporary and future operating environments.

Future practitioners of operational art will need to operate at the confluence of AirLand Battle and counterinsurgency theory, whereby the destruction or defeat of an enemy's armed forces only constitutes a necessary prerequisite for the *real* objective: a decisive engagement with a hostile or ambivalent populace. These seemingly disparate tasks, however, cannot be viewed with

linear precision or undertaken sequentially in phases. Rather, steps must be taken to win both the war and the peace within the construct of an overarching campaign design that thoughtfully integrates both combat and stability operations from the start. A

steps must be taken to win both the war and the peace within an overarching campaign design that integrates combat and stability operations from the start

sophisticated and adroit comprehension of the relationship between military means and political ends, not just "shock and awe" or battlefield brilliance, will be required. While no panacea, a careful examination of Scott's Mexico City Campaign nonetheless offers keen insight and valuable perspective on how to do so. Paradoxically, the keys to America's future success may not need to be reinvented but just relearned—*ex preteritis nostrum posterus*. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 1–19, 374–415.

² Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 188–197.

³ Jack K. Bauer, *The Mexican War, 1846–1848* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 1–13; and Justin Harvey Smith, *The War with Mexico*, vol. I (New York: Macmillan Company, 1919), 123.

⁴ Bauer, 17.

⁵ Stephen A. Carney, *The Occupation of Mexico, May 1846–July 1848* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005), 4–7.

⁶ Allan Peskin, *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2003), 136–137.

⁷ Brian G. Walton, "The Elections for the Thirtieth Congress and the Presidential Candidacy of Zachary Taylor," *The Journal of Southern History* 35, no. 2 (May 1969), 186–202.

⁸ Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D.*, vol. II (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 1270.

⁹ See Charles Winslow Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1937), 436–437.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Winfield Scott, "Veracruz and its Castle," House Executive Document 60, October 27, 1846, 1268–1270; and "Veracruz and its Castle—New line of operation, thence upon the capital," House Executive Document 60, November, 12, 1846, 1270–1274.

¹² Scott, *Memoirs*, vol. I, 404–405.

¹³ Bauer, 232–258.

¹⁴ Winfield Scott, "Proclamation," quoted in Elliott, 461.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 460–462.

¹⁶ Bauer, 271–272.

¹⁷ Anton Adams, *The War in Mexico* (Chicago: Emperor's Press, 1998), 90–91.

¹⁸ The details of Scott's final thrust from Puebla to the capture of Mexico City are taken from Bauer, 279–325; Elliott, 495–552; and Justin Harvey Smith, *The War with Mexico*, vol. II, 79–188. Also see Scott's official reports of the Battle of Molino del Rey, Battles of Contreras and Churubusco, and the Battle of Mexico City, available at <www.dmwv.org/mexwar/documents/cgordo.htm>.

¹⁹ Elliott, 553–557; Timothy D. Johnson, *A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 239–241.

²⁰ Johnson, 196.

²¹ Smith, *The War with Mexico*, vol. I, 3.

²² Johnson, 269.

²³ Edward S. Wallace, "The United States Army in Mexico City," *Military Affairs* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1949), 159.

²⁴ Bauer, 232–258. Also see Jack K. Bauer, "The Veracruz Expedition of 1847," *Military Affairs* 20, no. 3 (Autumn 1956), 162–169.

²⁵ Johnson, 114–116, 142–143, 266–268.

²⁶ Peskin, 159–160, 191.

²⁷ Carney, 1–3.

²⁸ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Phoenix Paperbacks, 2007), 145–161.

²⁹ For important perspective on the debate, see Robert M. Gates, "The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance," *Joint Force Quarterly* 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 2–7.

³⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 29–49, 53–55.

³¹ Russell Weigley, *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780–1782* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 1.

³² John McCuen, "Hybrid Wars," *Military Review* (March–April 2008), 113.

³³ For the dangers inherent in the selective use of historical example, see Howard, 188–197.