

# DEADLINE Approaching for *JFQ* Issue 55



## FEATURING

### Force Modernization, Technology, and Innovation

### 2009 Essay Competition Winners

Submissions Due by  
**June 1,  
2009**

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## *JFQ* Issue 56

Featuring

### Irregular Warfare, U.S. Special Operations

Submissions Due by  
**September 1, 2009**

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## Open Letter to *JFQ* Readers

*JFQ* seeks the assistance of its readership in exploring new ideas in force modernization, technology, and innovation. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has recently observed that it may be time to more carefully review the planned weapons programs of the individual Services to reduce costly, duplicative efforts: “We may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one Service and less in that of another Service—particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.” As the economic crisis makes the problem even more acute, striking the right balance between force modernization and recapitalization will provoke intense debate, especially as it occurs against the backdrop of emerging technologies and unforeseen national security developments.

*JFQ* encourages you to submit manuscripts that speak to these issues in addition to your unique professional strengths and interests. Boldly challenge traditional thought and practices in the joint, interagency, national security community, and propose a new school solution!

*JFQ* would also like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focuses. The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for upcoming issues:

### June 1, 2009

(Issue 55, 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2009):  
Force Modernization, Technology,  
and Innovation

### December 1, 2009

(Issue 57, 2<sup>d</sup> quarter 2010):  
The Expeditionary Interagency

### September 1, 2009

(Issue 56, 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2010):  
Irregular Warfare,  
U.S. Special Operations

### March 1, 2010

(Issue 58, 3<sup>d</sup> quarter 2010):  
Strategy and Strategists

*JFQ* readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the *So what?* question. That is, how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the reader’s professional understanding or performance? Speak to the implications from the operational to the strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! Visit [ndupress.ndu.edu](http://ndupress.ndu.edu) to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.

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# LETTER

**To the Editor**—I very much appreciate the spirited debate within the U.S. Army engendered by Colonel Gian Gentile's writings, particularly "Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars" (*Joint Force Quarterly* 52, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2009). Finding the appropriate balance between stability and combat operations is one of the most critical questions facing the U.S. Armed Forces, and Colonel Gentile has played an important role in that discussion. Unfortunately, he misrepresents my argument regarding the challenges facing the Armed Forces in one significant way. Colonel Gentile states that "John Nagl . . . is so cocksure of the efficacy of Army combat power that he believes it will have the ability not only to dominate land operations in general but to 'change entire societies'" (28).

Colonel Gentile selected the quoted material out of context from my review essay, published by the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute* in April 2008, on Brian Macallister Linn's excellent book *The Echo of Battle*. In that review, I argue that:

*victory in the Long War requires the strengthening of literally dozens of governments afflicted by insurgents who are radicalized by hatred and inspired by fear. The soldiers who win these wars require not just an ability to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies—and not all of those soldiers will wear uniforms, or work for the Department of the Army. The most important warriors of the current century may work for the US Information Agency rather than the Department of Defense.*

Those familiar with this context will recognize the metaphorical use of the term *soldier* as part of an argument to build interagency capability to conduct counterinsurgency more effectively. Winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the longer war against radical Islamic extremism, will require significant changes in the societies that engendered them. Although I have enormous faith in the capability of the U.S. Army, I think it needs help to perform a task of this magnitude. Success in the Long War depends on an

effective counterinsurgency capability that can facilitate and coordinate the development of host nation security capacity, good governance, and economic growth under wartime conditions. Although the Army is currently performing all three of these tasks, they are more properly the purview of other agencies of the U.S. Government. Thus, I have advocated significant increases in the resources devoted to the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, as well as the recreation of the United States Information Agency. A task force of these 21<sup>st</sup>-century warriors is required to win today's wars, and tomorrow's.


Some serious thinkers now suggest that the United States cannot afford to engage in nationbuilding or that it cannot succeed. I believe otherwise. Americans demonstrated in the Philippines at the turn of the last century, under General Creighton Abrams during the later years of the Vietnam conflict, and in our most recent operations in Iraq that we can help rebuild societies with some degree of success. The task is enormously difficult, but its completion will allow the United States and its allies to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving behind governments that are sovereign within their borders and do not provide a safe haven for terror. This mission is vital; as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, "the most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland—for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states" (*JFQ* 52, 3).

The most important responsibility of a state is the protection of its citizens from harm. Our national security apparatus failed us on September 11, and our Army was unprepared for the kinds of wars that resulted. It is the responsibility of national security professionals to learn from those mistakes and vow never to allow our Army and our nation to be unprepared again.

—John A. Nagl  
LTC (Ret.), U.S. Army  
Senior Fellow, Center for a New  
American Security  
Washington, DC



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This McNair Paper covers a broad spectrum of Middle Eastern military history through the eyes of Iraqi Lieutenant General Ra'ad Hamdani, who held various command positions in the 1980–1988 war and, during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, commanded the II Republican Guard Corps. Interviewed in depth by Kevin Woods and Williamson Murray over several days, General Hamdani shared his knowledge on a wide range of subjects, with emphasis on his experiences in Iraq's long war against Iran. This volume is provided in the hope that it will improve our understanding of Middle Eastern military thought, the new Iraqi military, neighboring countries, and the dynamics of a region vital to U.S. interests.

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