The Marine Corps enjoyed high enlistment rates in 2008

DOD (William D. Ross)

Bridging the Strategy-Resources Gap

Defense Planning in a Time of Crisis

By IONUT C. POPESCU

It has become almost a cliché in Washington to deplore the sorry state of defense budgeting. At the end of the Bush administration, the Pentagon's messy finances persuaded even nonpartisan defense analysts to use harsh words to describe the status of Department of Defense (DOD) ledgers. The International Institute for Strategic Studies recently warned of an "acute planning and budgetary crisis,"[1] while Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) called the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) a "poisoned chalice" for the Obama administration.[2] Despite reaching some of the highest levels in real dollars since the end of World War II, DOD's current forecast nevertheless underestimates the real amounts needed to fund today's and tomorrow's military—as it is currently envisioned in the department's programming documents. Thus, the Obama administration faces either making significant changes to plans or appropriating markedly larger amounts to defense spending over the next 4 years.

In its latest review of planned defense expenditures, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated significant shortages in each of the main categories of the defense budget:

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Operations and Maintenance (O&M); Military Personnel; Procurement; and Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E). When all "unbudgeted" costs are considered (which include the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, in a scenario involving U.S. troop levels declining by 2014 to about 35 percent of their current number), CBO estimates that over the 2008–2013 period, DOD will require $642 billion on average per year, about 24 percent more than the $489 billion estimated by the previous administration.[3] Moreover, CBO also warns of a multitude of worrisome factors, such as the rising costs of entitlement programs and the uncertain state of the American economy, which will limit the amount of funding available to DOD in the near future.[4]

With a large increase in funding unlikely, it seems reasonable that President Barack Obama will attempt to solve the Pentagon's financial problems by seeking a closer match of budgetary resources with the overall defense and national security strategy. Ideally, the administration should be able to choose from among competing priorities those that are most needed and eliminate the less relevant options to free up funds to make its plan affordable and sustainable. Should this happen, it would be one of the few times in history when the American defense planning process made a great deal of strategic sense. The reasons are twofold: first, the Pentagon's budgeting priorities are similar to the course of a big ship, where small rudder changes are all that is possible; and second, military procurement plans are more often than not rather impervious to policy direction.

Despite the sorry state of the previous administration's plans, it would be overly optimistic to hope for a dramatic overhaul from President Obama; the institutional inertia is just too powerful. The best that could be realistically demanded of the national security team is to integrate at least some of the hard budgetary choices into a coherent strategic framework that truly connects means with ends and takes into account both the internal and external factors determining the future of U.S. defense policy. This article is dedicated to providing such a concise analytical framework and suggests some of the critical questions that should be considered during the process preceding the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the Obama administration.

The article is grounded in a theoretical understanding of war and strategy strongly influenced by Clausewitzian thought. Thus, an appropriate depiction of future challenges must necessarily employ a holistic understanding of conflict. Descriptions of future war that fail to take into account both its operational grammar and its policy logic are incomplete at best and dangerously misleading at worst. For traditional and historical reasons, American defense planning has too often suffered from a debilitating bifurcation of strategic thinking: debates on war's grammar have been conducted without regard to political objectives, while policy and strategy debates have rarely considered the actual realities of the battlefield and the suitability of current military means to achieve the specified policy goals. Keeping in mind that strategy-making is above all a continuous process of matching means and ends according to dynamic changes in real-world circumstances, this study focuses on pointing out four interrelated factors—grand strategy, the Bush legacy, the nature of the threat, and the nature of modern warfare—that need to be considered during any *strate-*

strategy debates have rarely considered the actual realities of the battlefield and the suitability of current military means to achieve the specified policy goals

The United States must prepare for irregular warfare against adversaries such as these militiamen in Côte d'Ivoire

United Nations (Ky Chung)

gic deliberations on defense policy planning, programming, and budgeting.

A New Grand Strategy

If, as Clausewitz insisted, wars are acts of policy employed by statesmen to secure certain objectives, then the overall approach to international politics adopted by a polity should tell us a great deal about the types of wars it should prepare for. One might be tempted to analyze the campaign pronouncements of President-elect Obama or his surrogates and tease out his likely plans for the military. After all, it is customary for each new administration to espouse the central tenets of its approach to international security in a National Security Strategy, which serves as an overarching policy guide for the National Defense Strategy and the QDR. The latter two documents are meant to show how the department is "operationalizing" the President's strategy, and how it shifts its priorities to better accomplish the objectives of the administration.

Of course, anyone even vaguely familiar with U.S. defense budgetary issues would find the model described above, if somewhat logical in theory, rather unrealistic from a practical perspective. And overall this is a good thing for the United States: grand strategies are not supposed to change every 4 or 8 years, and they surely should not be based on a 50-page unclassified document put together by the staff of the National Security Council in the first months of a new administration. The Obama administration will nevertheless attempt to change the direction of U.S. grand strategy, and pundits will probably soon talk of an Obama "doctrine." The extent to which President Obama will be successful in changing the content and not merely the form of U.S. defense planning, however, depends on whether his administration manages to properly address most of the questions discussed below.

The first grand strategic question President Obama faces is whether he agrees with the diagnosis of the post-9/11 security environment promoted by the Bush administration in recent strategy documents. Are we in a "long war," a generational struggle against al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists that will require the kind of long-term commitment of resources the Cold War did? Should this be the main organizing principle around which our national security bureaucracy, including our military, must be optimized? If so, the

DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)

President Obama addresses media after meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss way forward in Afghanistan and Iraq

Obama administration has a long and difficult way ahead in shifting national security investments, especially since it is far from clear exactly what the military requirements of such a grand strategy are.

Much depends on the ways in which the Obama administration plans to fight this long war and, consequently, which missions will be assigned to the Defense Department. Each of the Services, albeit with various degrees of enthusiasm, has attempted over the last several years to adapt to the new strategic demands imposed by the Bush administration and to show how their capabilities and investments are relevant to the new missions. However, most of these efforts have been ad hoc, completely additive to their existing missions and programs, and lacking an overarching framework that would delineate specifically what the principal roles and missions of the American military are in defeating the global Salafist network.

The containment of the Soviet Union, if far from perfect, nevertheless represented a useful, coherent grand strategy that provided overall guidance to our military planning during the Cold War. Furthermore, the conventional nature of the enemy made the developments of our defense capabilities a fairly predictable process, based on technical metrics that we understood well. No such monolithic and stable enemy exists today, and thus no consistent strategic guidance exists either.

Shaping our national security apparatus to defeat a global terrorist network may well involve a shift in priorities from combat military capabilities to other instruments of U.S. power, such as economic aid, governance and law enforcement assistance, or public diplomacy. While increasing our efforts in such nonmilitary areas is a seemingly logical step in tackling terrorism, the unclassified strategy documents such as the 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* do not provide a detailed grand strategic framework to guide the development of such capabilities or to show how all instruments of national power are to be integrated in the pursuit of a common goal. Classified documents such as the *National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror* are likely to offer more on the necessary connections between means and ends, but the overall strategic quality of it is impossible to judge due to its unavailability in the public domain.

There is not even agreement so far on the basic characteristics of the enemy, as the heated debate between terrorism experts Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman showed.[5] Are the greatest threats to the United States coming from a "central core" based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, or from many smaller, often homegrown cells in Western Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere? If we accept the emerging conventional wisdom that the greatest threats

while increasing our efforts in nonmilitary areas is a logical step in tackling terrorism, unclassified strategy documents do not provide a detailed grand strategic framework

come from weak/failed states and ungoverned territories, then what exactly should the U.S. military be expected to do to promote "good governance" and mitigate these conditions? What is the relationship between the global Salafists and the local insurgent groups threatening various regimes around the world, and, consequently, how far should the United States go in supporting the latter? Is it reasonable to expect that al Qaeda sympathizers could gain control of a key state such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan? Above all, what is the overall political objective of the United States in this long war: a long-term focus on political transformation of the Muslim world to address the root causes of terrorism, a short-term focus on strengthening current regimes so they are able to deny safe haven to terrorist groups, or some delicate combination of the two? These are only some of the basic questions that need thorough analysis to determine the contours of a military focused on a generational war against Islamic militants.

If, on the other hand, the Obama administration considers the Salafist threat an important national security priority, but not the overarching challenge of this generation, then we are back to the yet-unanswered basic grand strategic question of the post–Cold War era: with the Soviet Union gone, what should be the main role of U.S. power in the world? If, following Clausewitz, acting strategically means using or threatening to use force to secure certain political objectives, then what are the U.S. policy goals most appropriate for military force, and what kind of forces would be most suited for securing them?

A thoughtful discussion on alternative U.S. grand strategies recently took place under the auspices of the Solarium II program, hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), among a significant number of foreign policy experts not entirely convinced of the suitability of the long war paradigm as the new organizing principle for national security policy. In the final chapter of the program's report, the authors argue for a grand strategy of sustainment: "The United States' relationship to the rest of the world necessitates a strategy that maintains a degree of basic order in the international system. . . . It is time for America to renew its longstanding bipartisan commitment to helping sustain the pillars of the modern international system."[6] This view of the United States as a promoter of global public goods and ultimate guarantor of the global order is neither new nor controversial in Washington circles; the debates between Democrats and Republicans have really been mostly over the ways and means of achieving such goals, with scant attention paid to assessing how available resources fit into the big picture.

When it comes to describing the roles of the U.S. military, the CNAS report is rather disappointing. In addition to securing the global commons (air, sea, and space), something the American military has long done,[7] the report fails to move beyond generalities such as the need to prevail on the "full spectrum of conflict" in the contested land and coastal areas. What missions are to be found on the spectrum and how the military should prioritize among them, the authors do not mention—except to say that leaders should allocate risk more prudently.[8]

In fairness to the authors, the wide-ranging scope of their valuable paper may not have allowed for more detailed analysis. Unfortunately, this lack of specificity when it comes to grand strategic debates is prevalent in Washington. Instead of focusing on the connections between means and ends, the discussions are highly skewed toward the policy ends desired and the ways to achieve them, without careful consideration of the means available. Alas, calling a list of policy goals and ideas about how to achieve them a "strategy document" does not make it so, unless one also shows convincingly *how* to employ available means to accomplish those goals. The critique above would hopefully be useful particularly for the Obama administration, which comes into the White House with a world view similar in many ways to that of the CNAS authors.

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Despite its lack of detail on implementation, having a coherent set of ideas about America's goals in the world, and hence basing decisions on a grand strategic framework, is clearly a valuable aim, and CNAS should be commended for its efforts to stimulate debate on this topic. Deploring the lack of a post–Cold War strategic consensus, Council on Foreign Relations historian Walter Russell Mead is right to warn of the dangers of not following any purposeful grand strategy:

Foreign policy doesn't go away in the absence of a strategic consensus; it proliferates. The United States has policies from each of the four schools [Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian] *but no strategy. . . . Various executive departments and both houses of Congress freelance, developing points of view of their own.*[9]

Having said that, however, a word of caution is in order. The Obama administration should be fully aware that the failure to develop a clearly articulated post–Cold War grand strategy may have been caused by objective circumstances that could hinder its own efforts as well. Arguing for more grand strategic thinking, Henry Kissinger nevertheless pointed to:

the impossibility of applying a single formula to the analysis and interpretation of the contemporary international order. For in today's world, at least four international systems are existing side by side. . . . Whether it is values or power, ideology or raison d'état that are the determinants of foreign policy, in fact depends on the historical stage at which an international system finds itself. For American foreign policy, ever in quest of the magic, all-purpose formula, the resulting need for ideological subtlety and long-range strategy presents a special and as yet unsolved challenge.[10]

As if the complexity of today's geopolitical world were not enough, one must also account for its heightened unpredictability in comparison with the Cold War era. As Williamson Murray noted at a National Defense University conference:

[George] *Kennan could write an article* ["The Sources of Soviet Conduct"] *that seems so brilliant in retrospect, because the landscape of strategic competition remained so stable. No such article* [as Kennan's], *laying out the next forty years could have been written in 1914, or 1938, or 1860, for that matter, because the landscape of the future was to prove so turbulent. And that is why few at best will prove able to capture even glimmers of the emergent future that will confront the United States over the next quarter century.*[11]

To sum up, the Obama administration's grand strategy, should it succeed in having one, is the first factor that should influence the defense budgeting process. However, for this to occur, it is necessary to be much more precise on how we expect our military forces to contribute to accomplishing national security objectives in today's world, and to make sure the necessary capabilities are available to achieve such goals.



F/A–18 Hornet from USS *Nimitz* escorts Russian Tu-95 Bear bomber that approached *Nimitz*, February 2, 2008

U.S. Navy

The Bush Defense Legacy

Even if the Obama administration has a clear vision for its defense policy grounded in a sound appreciation of the means available and of the proper roles of the military in the context of its national security strategy, it nevertheless has to operate in an environment characterized by a highly demanding set of challenges left by the Bush administration. Its options for shaping the budgetary and programmatic decisions are necessarily limited by the effects of recent policies. To take one relevant example, congressional estimates show that the Pentagon may be facing up to a $100-billion tab to repair and replace worn-out equipment from Iraq and Afghanistan; these "reset" costs are unbudgeted in future plans, and funding them would surely hinder any competing defense priorities President Obama may have.[12] Another $100 billion is scheduled to support enlarging the Army and the Marine Corps over the next several years, further restricting resources for other priorities.[13]

A couple of reports from the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS detail some of the most significant problems of the current defense spending plans that need to be addressed by the new Pentagon team; four are worth mentioning here.[14] First, plans under the Bush administration ignored the future costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. No matter how soon one hopes to diminish the U.S. commitments in these two countries, recent experience, as well as estimates by nonpartisan groups such as the Congressional Budget Office, show that at least for the first years of President Obama's term, the United States will still have to spend considerable sums for these two missions. A closely related problem is represented by the increasing reliance on "emergency supplementals" for what are obviously costs that could and should be integrated into a coherent multiyear spending plan for issues such as force reset, long-term readiness, increases in manpower, and force transformation. Hence, as Cordesman writes, "There is no clear or coherent plan, program, or budget that reflects the fact the nation is at war and no credible mix of force plans, modernization plans, and procurement plans for the future."[15]

Second, echoing the theme of the disconnect between grand strategy and defense budgeting, the CSIS studies also deplore this decoupling of U.S. strategy and policy goals on the one hand, and the creation of specific forces and readiness plans to implement them on the other. Despite having some value, efforts such as the QDR process and the various Service-specific strategic reviews too often fail to ensure the necessary connections between means and ends.

Third, as military analyst Frank Hoffman also noted, military manpower costs have been steadily increasing over recent years and are expected to remain very high in the near future.[16] In addition to the costs of recruiting and retention in a challenging wartime environment, a large part of this increase is due to rising health care costs for both Active-duty soldiers and veterans; these latter costs really represent a long-term "de facto military entitlement" that should be properly planned for by the Obama administration.[17]

Finally, there is the much-maligned problem of cost escalation for DOD's acquisition portfolio. The most recent Government Accountability Office assessment of the Pentagon's major weapons programs showed that these costs rose from $790 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to $1.6 trillion in FY2007, and outstanding commitments rose from $380 billion to $858 billion. The estimated total acquisition costs growth increased from $42 billion in 2000 to no less than $295 billion in 2007.[18] Furthermore, a budgetary practice called "slipping to the right" compounds the problem: procurement funding increased more robustly beginning with FY2009, which means critical investment decisions regarding affordability were passed on to President Obama.[19] The combined effects of the four factors described above lead Cordesman to conclude that the Obama administration will have to reshape almost every aspect of current defense plans, programs, and budgets.[20]

Nature of Threats

The recent strategy documents elaborated by the Defense Department have often employed a framework of analyzing threats by categorizing them as conventional (traditional), irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic. These attributes, however, are more properly describing ways of threatening U.S. interests, not what are the actual threats to national interests worth defending by force of arms. This process of overvaluing the importance of the grammar of modern warfare relative to its policy logic—a byproduct of "capabilities-based planning"—leads to a poor understanding of the real-world needs of the U.S. military. To talk strategically about the nature of present threats

necessarily requires at first an understanding of the security interests that may need defending, and of the likely political objectives that will be desired in the aftermath of possible conflicts. Colin Gray likes to remind audiences that, ultimately, "war is only about the peace that follows."[21] This basic tenet of strategic theory should be one of the starting points for the Obama administration's efforts at defense reform.

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Just as with the case of a new grand strategy, the Obama administration first needs to decide whether it agrees with the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the kinds of threats worthy of military intervention and the extent of commitment likely to be required if the United States intervenes. As Steve Metz and Frank Hoffman observed, the Bush administration made "the war on terror" the main organizing principle of U.S. security strategy, and it decided on a global counterinsurgency framework to address this challenge. The authors rightly conclude that if the Obama administration continues on the same general path, "involvement in irregular warfare and stabilization operations in weak and failing states will be its most common activity—perhaps its only major one."[22]

Depending on its grand strategic priorities, the Obama administration ought to provide clear political guidance to the Pentagon during its first major defense review by addressing some very tough questions: Does countering global terrorism require large-scale military commitments, to include counterinsurgency and stability operations, in failed or failing states? Is the nexus between weapons of mass destruction and global terror networks so dangerous that preemptive strikes will be seriously considered? If so, is regime change, followed by nation-building, a necessary followup measure in the aftermath of such an attack? Leaving the war on terror aside for the moment, how far would the United States go in preventing a would-be regional hegemon from disturbing the current balance of power in a strategically significant region such as the Persian Gulf or East Asia?

The answers to these questions have wide-ranging implications for the prioritization of future resources. For far too long, DOD avoided making tough yet necessary tradeoffs and instead relied on vacuous, all-encompassing concepts such as full spectrum operations, on ill-managed modernization plans, and on stretching the current force to the limit through what Frederick Kagan aptly criticized as "a strategy for heroes."[23] In the broadest possible grand strategic choice, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will reject the "world-ordering" role the United States has had, in various ways, since the end of World War II. Hence, at least some of the military requirements of the past—such as maintaining the command of air, sea, and space—will likely remain the same. The threats to these goals are fairly well understood, and the U.S. military has so far been successful in countering them. While the level of resources needed to maintain supremacy in these domains remains a matter of intense debate, there is a general agreement inside the U.S. defense community on the proper role of military force in securing the dominance of these realms.

The toughest question for the Obama administration is related to land warfare in general, and irregular/counterinsurgency campaigns in particular. Such campaigns, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed once again, have the potential of becoming costly affairs with uncertain prospects of victory, especially if the end-state goals are expansive (that is, if they include a large number of political, economic, and social reforms usually grouped under the "nation-building" category). If President Obama indeed agrees that present security threats require the military to become involved in protracted land conflicts on a regular basis in various troubled parts of the world, the challenge is to plan for the necessary increases in resources dedicated to ground troops to make such a strategy sustainable. If, on the other hand, a different approach is preferred, one in which the United States attempts to secure its interests in key areas mainly by substituting local allied forces for U.S. troops supported by a small number of U.S. military and nonmilitary advisors, then the challenge is to show that this strategy can bring real, lasting results.

Lastly, President Obama may regard global terrorism as a threat different from insurgency, and hence more suitably addressed by an intelligence and law enforcement campaign than by a counterinsurgency campaign. In this situation, the planning process of the U.S. military would focus mainly on scenarios not dominated by a concern with the long war.

Nature of Modern Warfare

The last factor that ought to play an important role in the effort to improve U.S. defense planning is a better understanding of the predominant characteristics of modern warfare, and also—just as importantly—a more realistic appreciation of our limits in predicting future developments. The emerging conventional wisdom among civilian and military leaders holds that the United States needs to shift its focus away from a traditional vision of conflict toward something that resembles what the American military is facing now in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is alternatively referred to as irregular (or asymmetric, or unconventional) warfare, counterinsurgency, or stability operations. This shift in priorities has not been uncontroversial, and even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously noted that important parts of the defense establishment have been less than enthusiastic about this agenda. Some military leaders have expressed concern about a dangerous decline in readiness for high-intensity conflicts, while others worried about the wisdom of becoming involved in such protracted counterinsurgency given the high costs and uncertain benefits.[24]

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Even counterinsurgency experts often found much to criticize in the way the U.S. defense community chose to define the basic tenets of modern insurgencies, and warned of the unsuitability of military solutions to many

of today's conflicts.[25] Yet other sophisticated experts pointed to the false "conventional versus irregular" dichotomy, and instead suggested terms such as *hybrid* or *multimodal* wars, which include characteristics of both, to describe the proper nature of modern conflict.[26] American and British military doctrines are already adapting to such trends, preparing for a future where the distinctions between various modes of warfare will become ever more blurred.[27]

While these debates on the lessons of recent conflicts undoubtedly point out some valuable lessons, the Obama administration is well advised to ground its planning in something more than the illusion that it can discover the one true "nature" of present or future warfare. Current conflicts may be a useful harbinger of future wars, but this is far from certain. A plausible argument could be made that insurgency tactics have been the most useful ways to frustrate U.S. objectives in recent conflicts, not necessarily because the American military was not proficient in irregular warfare, but because U.S. objectives have been so expansive as to necessitate a long-term occupation. The logical extension of this argument would lead us to conclude that, should the United States pursue more limited goals in future conflicts, then those wars would be of a different character than Iraq or Afghanistan. The same would hold true if the enemy were more technologically sophisticated and able to deny access to some U.S. platforms or hold on to its own territory longer than the hapless Taliban and Iraqis. The Secretary of Defense certainly has a point that "next-war-itis" should not prevent the Pentagon from developing the capabilities to win the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but neither should we fall into the trap of thinking that future wars will surely be of a similar nature.[28]

A balanced and flexible approach to force structure is far preferable to investing most resources toward a specific mode of warfare. The challenge for the Obama administration is to build a defense plan that achieves this set of multimodal military capabilities within the constraints imposed by legacy commitments and by a level of financial resources sustainable over the long term. Given the way the defense budgeting process works, with its myriad influences from actors whose interests are only marginally related to the overall national security of the United States, attempting to achieve a closer match between strategy and resources is bound to be frustrating. Nevertheless, the administration cannot escape confronting this massive challenge of putting the Pentagon's finances on a more sustainable path. **JFQ**

NOTES

[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "America's Expansive Defence," *Strategic Comments* 14, no. 4 (May 2008).

[2] Anthony H. Cordesman, *A Poisoned Chalice: The Crisis in National Security Planning, Programming, and Budgeting* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2008).

[3] Calculated by the author based on data from Department of Defense (DOD), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2008* (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2007), 67; and Congressional Budget Office (CBO), *Long Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2008* (Washington, DC: CBO, December 2007), 3.

[4] See CBO, *The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018* (Washington, DC: CBO, January 2008).

[5] Eric Schmitt and Elaine Sciolino, "A Not Very Private Feud over Terrorism," *The New York Times*, June 8, 2008.

[6] Shawn Brimley, Michèle A. Flournoy, and Vikram J. Singh, "Making America Grand Again," in *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy*, ed. Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2008), 137.

[7] Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), 5–46.

[8] Ibid., 139.

[9] Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 314.

[10] Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 25, 27. Kissinger divides the world into four "international systems" at different historical stages: U.S.–Europe–Latin America (21st century), Asia (similar to 19th-century Europe), Middle East (7th-century Europe), and Africa (no precedent in European history).

[11] Williamson R. Murray, "The Past as Prologue: Lessons of the Past?" paper presented at *Strategic Re-Assessment: From Long-Range Planning to Future Strategy and Forces*, 2008 Joint Operations Symposium, Washington, DC, June 4–5, 2008.

[12] Tom Vanden Brook, "Military facing $100 billion in Equipment Repairs," *USA Today*, June 26, 2008.

[13] For a brief analysis of some of the possible "strategic opportunity costs" of this decision, see Steven K. Metz, "Expand the U.S. Military? Not So Fast," *Strategic Studies Institute Monthly*, July 7, 2008.

[14] Anthony H. Cordesman and Ionut C. Popescu, *The Changing Challenges to U.S. Defense Spending: An Update* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2007); Cordesman, *A Poisoned Chalice*.

[15] Cordesman, 1.

[16] In addition to the CSIS reports, see also Frank G. Hoffman, "Strategic Security Spending," *Armed Forces Journal* (March 2008), available at <www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/03/3348179>.

[17] Cordesman, 100.

[18] Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs*, March 2008, 7, available at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d08467sp.pdf>.

[19] Cordesman and Popescu, 30.

[20] Cordesman, 1.

[21] Colin S. Gray, "Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 6.

[22] While the authors find this recent emphasis likely to continue in the Obama administration, they do not agree with the bipartisan consensus regarding the wisdom of increasing the number of U.S. troops to better prepare for more missions such as the one in Iraq. See Steven K. Metz and Frank G. Hoffman, *Better not bigger: Restructuring America's Ground Forces*, Policy Analysis Brief (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, September 2007). See also Steven K. Metz, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, July 2008).

[23] Frederick W. Kagan, "A Strategy for Heroes," *The Weekly Standard* 11, no. 22 (February 2006).

[24] Yochi Dreazen, "Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy," *Wall Street Journal*, April 7, 2008, A3; Jeffrey Record, *The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency*, Policy Analysis No. 577 (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, September 1, 2006); Michael J. Mazarr, "The Folly of Asymmetric Warfare," *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008), 33–53.

[25] Steven K. Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st-Century Insurgency," *Parameters* 37, no. 4 (Winter 2007), 20–32.

[26] Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007); John J. McCuen, "Hybrid Wars," *Military Review* (March-April 2008), 107–114.

[27] U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, June 2008), 12; and United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *The Future Maritime Operational Concept 2007* (Shrivenham, England: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2007), 1–12.

[28] Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, "A Battle over 'The Next War,'" *Los Angeles Times*, July 21, 2008.