

Off the Shelf

Seven years into the war on terror, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have more collective counterinsurgency experience than any fighting force in the world. Nonetheless, the Armed Forces must continue to improve their capability to fight and win in irregular conflicts as well as conventional ones. As the United States anticipates a new Presidential administration, questions abound within the joint and interagency communities regarding the future of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, troop deployments, and force structure. The two volumes below represent some of the best current thinking about how the United States should pursue its interests in a “hybrid” world, one not confined to the interests of nation-states.



Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portents for the Future

By Max G. Manwaring

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008

248 pp. \$34.95


ISBN: 978-0-8061-3970-8

Max Manwaring, a professor of military strategy at the U.S. Army War College's renowned Strategic Studies Institute, continues his decades of researching and writing on insurgencies and counterinsurgency strategy with this volume. He sets out to provide civilian policymakers and military strategists with a set of case studies and lessons learned covering security threats presented by insurgents in some

20th-century conflicts that do not receive much attention in mainstream debate about insurgencies and asymmetric warfare. Manwaring points out that the attacks of September 11 were a watershed event that signaled wars would no longer be limited to well-structured conflicts between nation-states. He asserts in the introduction that “the sociology of war, of war making, and of those who are able to make it has changed.” Whether one agrees with this statement, one cannot deny Manwaring's admonition that “the conscious choices made by civil-military leadership in the international community and in individual nation-states about how to deal with the contemporary nontraditional security environment will define the processes of national, regional, and global security, stability and well-being far into the future” (p. 4).

Manwaring not only analyzes several national security threats, including contemporary terrorist and insurgent activities, but also covers Colombian insurgencies, gangs and criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico, the insurgencies in Portugal and Uruguay, and Italy's counterter-

ror campaign of 1968–1983. He writes, “The relevance of this book lies in its transmission of hard-learned lessons of the past and present to current and future leaders.”



Achieving Victory in Iraq: Countering an Insurgency

By Dominic J. Caraccilo and Andrea L. Thompson

Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008

240 pp. \$24.95

ISBN: 978-0-8117-0388-8

Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, a brigade combat team commander in the U.S. Army's famed 101st Airborne Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrea Thompson, military assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army, combine the experience gained in their collective five tours of duty in Iraq to produce a timely and instructive book described in the foreword as a “handbook” for how to effectively engage with and prevail alongside the Iraqi people. Army and Marine Corps employment of recently revised U.S. doctrine on how to fight and win in counterinsurgency warfare is proving effective in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States, however, must maintain and hone its ability to fight and win conventional wars, but there is no argument that its forces must be able to simultaneously fight and win in irregular and asymmetric conflicts as well.

This book is not a “Monday morning quarterback” critique from people who have “been there and done that” and think that it would have all turned out better if only they had been in charge. Quite to the contrary, Caraccilo and Thompson provide an excellent history of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and set the context for where we find ourselves today in Iraq. They state in the introduction that they believe there was and is a strategy for Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and that their purpose in writing is to convey how, based on what has worked, to bring that strategy to a successful conclusion.

Of particular use to military and civilian leaders is their survey of successful commanders in Iraq and descriptions of how each achieved their success in their respective situations. In the final chapter, the authors wrap up their analysis by recounting the most recent strategic guidance and operational imperatives, and even offer a set of “kit bag items” based on proven tactical experience. If busy warfighters and policy-makers only have time to read one book on counterinsurgency, reading this one would be time well spent.

Other recent titles recommended:

■ Kagan, Frederick W. and Thomas Donnelly. *Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power*. Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2008. 161 pp. \$20.00 (Paperback)

■ Marston, Daniel and Carter Malkasian, eds. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. New York: Random House, 2008. 204 pp. \$27.95 (Hardcover)

■ West, Bing. *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*. New York: Random House, 2008. 448 pp. \$28.88 (Hardcover)

—R.E. Henstrand



Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age: A Reference Handbook
by Sanford Lakoff

Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007

180 pp. \$54.95

ISBN-10: 0-275-99324-8

Reviewed by

JEFFREY L. CATON

Military history is replete with examples of competing policies emphasizing both offensive and defensive efforts as the best approach to ensure national security. Policies pertaining to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles share this history of controversy, which reveals consequences of their development and use—such as significant economic and political impacts during their development and devastating destruction in their operation—that warrant serious consideration. Over \$115 billion has been spent on U.S. missile defense over the last 25 years, and an additional \$9.3 billion may be spent during fiscal year 2009. Recent negotiations to put U.S. ballistic missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic contribute to our strained relations with Russia. Dramatic hypervelocity interceptions of satellites by China in January 2007 and the United States in February 2008 demonstrate the advanced state of technology related to missile defense.

Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age provides important historical context for anyone trying to analyze these current events. The title of the book certainly suggests an ambitious task, since the term *strategic defense* has many dimensions, and the *nuclear age* harkens back to many Cold War-era weapons systems developed and

operated over the course of more than 60 years. In his preface, Sanford Lakoff more accurately refines his book's overall scope as a review of U.S. efforts to develop and deploy defenses against attack by ballistic missiles, focusing on events since President Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. Given this stipulation, the book hits its mark as a general overview of active ballistic defenses appropriate for a reader unfamiliar with this topic.

The book's strengths are its presentation and analysis of the political aspects of ballistic missile defense pursuits. It provides a concise historical sketch of the evolution of the post-World War II security environment from the emergence of nuclear powers to the Cold War-era deterrence theory of mutual assured destruction. This background sets the stage for a discussion of the pursuit of active defenses, which centers on Reagan's tenacious quest to provide national options against nuclear missile attack other than to "push the button or do nothing." Lakoff contends that Reagan's public announcement of the SDI program, quickly nicknamed "Star Wars," caught most of his advisors by surprise. The author provides an analysis of the repercussions related to SDI goals as well as an interesting insight into the interactions among Congress, the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age also explores SDI's effects on the ongoing Cold War, with particular emphasis on events in Western Europe. The author weaves together many key influences in his discussion, including changes in Soviet (and later Russian) leadership, implications to North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense planning, effects of ongoing strategic arms reduction negotiations, and elimination of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe.

Lakoff provides a technical overview chapter of SDI architecture and its major components.


Unfortunately, his writing is choppy and the selection of technical material is inconsistent, thus distracting from the preceding chapters. A section on "Problems and Controversies" introduces several thought-provoking issues that provide a good segue to the concluding chapter, a 31-page review of significant strides in U.S. active missile defense during the three administrations following Reagan as well as many technical and policy issues that continue to foster debate. This work describes the first Bush and Clinton administrations' evolution toward a limited missile defense goal versus the original SDI "impenetrable shield" to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." It highlights the second Bush administration's 2002 withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that enabled the current use of layered defenses incorporating weapons systems of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. Lakoff's closing thoughts raise germane concerns regarding how these defenses contribute to a shift from the current militarization of space to its possible weaponization. He also raises the questions of how effective these defenses can be against terrorists using nuclear weapons, as well as how to balance their costs with those for homeland defense.

The book's only appendix is the article "Holes in the Missile Shield," by physicist Richard L. Garwin, updated slightly from its original publication in 2004. The article summarizes many of the key technical aspects of the book, and it may serve as a good starting point for those deciding whether to read the entire volume. Other sources for further research are included in a bibliography.

Overall, the book contains a number of factual errors and offers only limited citations and tabulated data. Also, its glossary is simply a list of the book's acronyms and does not explain key scientific terms, as promised on the back cover. Unfortunately, this distracts from the work's value as a reference handbook. Still, *Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age* suffices as an adequate introduc-

tory primer of a highly enduring geopolitical issue. If the reader is inspired to delve more deeply into the technical aspects of missile defense history, the Historical Office of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command offers the outstanding text *Seize the High Ground: The U.S. Army in Space and Missile Defense* (2003) on its Web site at <www.smdc.army.mil/2008/HistoryBook.asp>. Although none of these works will turn readers into "rocket scientists," they will certainly enhance understanding of the technical and political intricacies required to defend against missiles or, possibly in the future, space weapons.

Colonel Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, is a faculty member and Defense Transformation Chair at the U.S. Army War College. He has over 26 years of experience in space operations, joint operations, and acquisition management.



The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War

by Brian McAllister Linn

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007

312 pp. \$27.95

ISBN-13: 978-0-674-02651-3

Reviewed by

BYRON E. GREENWALD

In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu admonishes would-be political and military leaders to "know yourself and know your enemy and in one hundred battles you will be victorious." When it comes to conducting postwar analysis and adjusting warfighting concepts in preparation for the next war, Brian McAllister Linn shows how America's political and military elite have failed over the last two centuries to recognize the

impact of competing martial traditions on decisions regarding U.S. Army doctrine and force structure. Our failure to understand the pervasive influence of these philosophies on defense policy demonstrates that we do not know ourselves very well and that we are often our own worst enemy.

Linn examines the Army's historical efforts to learn the lessons of its last war and adjust its doctrine and materiel to accomplish a perceived set of new missions. In doing so, he provides an invaluable service to civilian and military leaders who invariably desire to "reform" the military once the last cannon sounds. While Sun Tzu educated leaders on fighting *with* swords and crossbows, Linn provides a penetrating discussion of the recurrent internal fighting *over* which weapons and warfighting concepts will dominate the Army's future way of war. He examines the (often erroneous) defense planning assumptions emerging from the major American wars of the 19th and 20th centuries and the impact those assumptions had on preparing for the next conflict.

Linn contends that one of the problems facing the Services today is that military and defense intellectuals have failed to identify an appropriate concept of war. While buzzwords abound—*shock and awe*, *fourth-generation warfare*, *net-centricity*, *asymmetric conflict*—the military does not have a concept of war that is robust enough to permit proper prewar preparation. He offers that defining a national way of war necessitates going beyond operational narratives, which tend to focus on the conduct of the last series of battles and engagements, and requires recognizing that "the way a military force conducts war very much depends on how it prepares for war" (p. 3). Most importantly, he observes that a Service's perception of its past and the legacy of its martial traditions greatly influence its peacetime preparation. Linn correctly notes that the military is not rigid, hierarchical, and monolithic, but rather is very much a plurality with several communities fighting

for primacy. As such, Linn defines three American martial philosophies, each espoused by a different group—*Guardians*, *Heroes*, and *Managers*—and maintains that as each group pushes its philosophy, the emerging American way of war becomes further confused.

The Guardian philosophy dominated 19th-century military thinking, with narrative threads still visible in today's defense debate. Guardians believe that war is both an art and a science and that only those who master the science should be allowed to practice the art. They see war as an engineering problem as evident in coastal defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative, homeland security, force protection (the Green Zone), and preemptive war. Guardian philosophy is also apparent in catch phrases such as *precision engagement*, *dominant maneuver*, and *win decisively*, which suggest success irrespective of enemy actions.

Heroes emphasize the "human element and define warfare by personal intangibles such as military genius, experience, courage, morale, and discipline." They value adaptability and innovation. Of the three groups, Heroes are the best at adjusting to different situations and can provide both an intellectual and practical framework for a range of military operations. Heroes understand that "securing the peace" is as important as "winning the war." They tend, however, to disregard the hard thinking and staffwork that make their vision achievable (for example, General George Patton's dismissal of logistics). Overreliance on Heroic muddy-boots fundamentalism and anti-intellectual reductionism ("I am a warrior, not a manager") can cause one to dismiss the complexity inherent in warfare (p. 7).


Managers often oppose both the Guardians and Heroes. Epitomized by Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, the Managers can provide excellent broad strategic leadership but can also become fixated on the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development,

personnel, and facilities aspects of building, training, and fielding a mass army and can miss or dismiss the complexity of smaller conflicts, postconflict operations, and unconventional missions. Like their corporate brethren in the business world, the Managers' preferred method of problem solving is "reorganization." Managerial philosophy focuses more on corporate management than on warfighting.

Multiple martial traditions or philosophies exist within all the Services. They are separate and distinct from various transient warfighter "communities," such as the Army's "Airborne Mafia," the "black shoe Navy," or the "fighter jocks" of the Air Force. They also influence policy discussions in a more fundamental fashion. For defense professionals, the value in reading *The Echo of Battle* comes in appreciating how these martial traditions may emerge during defense policy discussions. While one philosophy may dominate a debate, all are present in one form or another and work to confuse our thinking. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each philosophy may help bring the best out of each and allow senior leaders to shepherd the creation of a truly unifying and joint vision for the future.

Brian Linn has made a significant contribution to the history of the U.S. Army and to the body of knowledge on military innovation, transformation, and defense policy. A review of the existing literature on the subject reveals that while a small portion discusses the impact of Service culture on military innovation, transformation, or change, none of the literature exposes the intellectual underpinnings of a military Service to the degree seen in *The Echo of Battle*. In that respect and many others, Linn has broken new ground.

Dr. Bryon E. Greenwald is a retired U.S. Army Colonel and an Assistant Professor of Military Theory and Historical Foundation in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College.



China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force

Edited by Andrew S. Erickson et al.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007
400 pp. \$45.00
ISBN: 978-1-59114-326-0

Reviewed by
JOHN D. BECKER

Strategists now surveying the globe for future threats are looking beyond the ongoing U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan at many other international security threats, including terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations, and failed states. Increasingly, several regional threats have emerged, including the People's Republic of China (PRC). China's economic development has garnered much attention, but another focal point has been its military growth. A major concern in that area has been China's nuclear forces, including its nuclear submarine fleet. Naval War College professors Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson explore that concern in depth in this book, which was drawn together from the results of a 2005 conference at which Active duty naval officers, academics, and policy experts met to discuss this new era in China's military development.

The premise of *China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force* is that the nuclear submarine fleet is now recognized as the centerpiece of China's naval strategy. The work is divided into five parts, including an exploration of the wider context for Chinese nuclear submarine development; an examination of the dimensions of the new submarine capabilities;

a discussion of current and future PRC nuclear submarine operations; an assessment of Cold War lessons for understanding the development of the PRC nuclear submarine force; and a discussion of the implications for U.S. national security in general and the U.S. Navy in particular. Worth noting is that this text is both more specific and broader in its scope of conception. It is more specific in that it looks at the neglected sector of China's undersea force—that small proportion of Chinese submarines using nuclear propulsion—and broader in that it concerns China's submarine force, navy, and grand strategy as a whole.

In the opening chapter, Rear Admiral Erik McVadon provides a detailed summary of current developments in the Chinese navy and includes a discussion of the maturity of the submarine fleet within the People's Liberation Army Navy, the role of the fleet in terms of the Taiwan "problem," and the potential threat the fleet poses to the United States.

In a chapter on the context of China's current maritime strategy, Bernard Cole argues persuasively that an understanding of that strategy must be grounded in an understanding of Chinese history, particularly since 1949. He also notes that while the Chinese navy once embraced Soviet ideas about strategy, it has since rejected them in order to develop its submarine fleet as a flexible, ready instrument of national security.

Additional chapters explore topics including analysis of available data concerning the capabilities of China's nuclear submarine; the implications of this analysis for China, the United States, and other major powers; and what, if any, lessons from the Cold War apply to the current situation. The collection also is unique in that five of the chapters draw substantially upon original Chinese sources. That reference is helpful in that it also shows the development of Chinese military analysis itself, something that has been downplayed in the past.

China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force is a followup to *China's Strategic Seapower*, by John Lewis and Xue Litai, published in 1993, which concluded that China had a seabased retaliatory capability. While arguably a premature conclusion at that time, *China's Future Nuclear Force*, looking at the second generation of Chinese nuclear submarines, presents a stronger claim for that conclusion. The Chinese navy, through its nuclear submarine fleet, is currently able to project power throughout China's littoral shores, from Taiwan, Honshu, and Sumatra. Soon, through the pursuit of its offshore defense maritime strategy, it will be able to project power throughout all of East Asia.

China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force provides both novices and experienced scholars an extensive primer on the context of the Chinese nuclear submarine fleet. It is quite readable, well organized, and extremely well documented in all chapters. It provides a solid foundation for understanding a new global security threat and its key elements.

Regardless of the political direction that China takes, the development of its military (and in particular its nuclear submarine fleet) bears watching. But it is important to remember that our own tendency to want to refight the same war again may apply here, too. That is particularly true given that many of the new Chinese nuclear submarines come from Russia, that the People's Liberation Army Navy originally used Soviet strategy and tactics, and that the U.S. Navy remains very much a force in search of a new naval rival. That bias can color the way we see this new threat and cause us to misunderstand it, as well as how to best deal with it.

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Becker, USA (Ret.), Ph.D., is on the faculties of the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies, Norwich University's Diplomacy program, and the University of Maryland University College.

Gaming the 21st Century

National Strategic Gaming Center

Welcome to a new series on simulation and gaming in *Joint Force Quarterly*. With this column, the National Strategic Gaming Center (NSGC) at the National Defense University (NDU) intends to reach out to the community of simulation and gaming practitioners, stimulating debate about best practices in game design and analyses and sharing findings and insights from specific exercises with the wider national security policy community.

The discipline has long lacked an energized professional discourse about how games are best put together and what consumers can (and cannot) learn from them. This lack of substantive activity is costly to the wider policy and analytical community, whose members are left with few reference points for evaluating how seriously they should take the findings from games and how useful participation in them might be, and with little awareness of the interesting topics and exercises being run throughout the national security community. Despite some admirable attempts to stimulate debate and research, even Defense Department university-based wargaming groups have avoided publishing, lecturing, and generally competitively comparing ideas about why and how we do what we do.

A research initiative launched in 2008 seeks to fill this void and to invite colleagues in other gaming shops and the wider policy community to engage with us by participating in events, criticizing, contesting, elaborating, or extending research ideas. We want to challenge practitioners to reexamine how they write games and draw conclusions. We similarly wish to encourage and enable consumers of games to critically assess them. Our overarching focus is on gaming 21st-century challenges—both identifying issues and trends that could be well served by gaming and weighing whether and where exercise design needs to adapt in order to reflect these new issues.

What Policy Games Can Do . . .

NSGC conducts strategic-level exercises in which scenarios concerning broad national or homeland security crises are described to participants, including executive branch officials, senior combatant command staffs, NDU, and Members of Congress—all of whom are asked to determine the best decision for that situation. These types of games go by many names—for instance, political-military exercises, seminar games, tabletop exercises—but share some common attributes. They are *qualitatively specified*; that is, game rules