

The following article describes the history and evolution of a much needed but arguably aged concept, the national security professional (NSP). This year, the National Defense University's (NDU's) National War College (NWC), Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), and Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) are administering and assessing the NSP pilot program. This is the initial program to educate 15 students from NWC, 15 from ICAF, and 8 from JFSC in interagency policies and issues.

There are many challenges to the NSP program, but four areas require particular attention:

- funding
- agency and department cultures and doctrines
- legislation and enforcement
- NSP designation recognition within the interagency domain.

Funding. The major challenge to starting and continuing the NSP education system is identifying the funding streams and owners. As highlighted in the following article, history has shown that funding was the main reason that Lieutenant General Leonard Gerow's recommendation to General Dwight Eisenhower for a National Security University did not fulfill its original intent. One of the five colleges from the Gerow Board's recommendations, ICAF, was already in place, and, as time went on, three of the remaining four colleges came into existence in one form or another: NWC, the Joint Intelligence College (National Intelligence University), and the Department of State College (Foreign Service Institute).

Although funding is still a key challenge today, it does not have to be the major challenge. Much of the infrastructure and many of the courses are already in place within the U.S. Government at facilities such as NDU, the Service war colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, and the National Intelligence University, to name just a few. It is up to the NSP leaders within the Services, agencies, and departments to step back and make a smart and coordinated effort to answer these questions:

- What core abilities should the national security professional possess?
- What is required to educate the NSP cadre using resources in and out of the Government?
- What does the U.S. Government already have in place that will fulfill some or all of the requirement?
- What is the connectivity between the overall NSP strategy and budgets?
- Does the Service, agency, or department that funds the lion's share of the program then become its "owner" and have the right to pick its director?

Agency Cultures and Doctrines. This may be the hardest issue to resolve. Not only do the agencies and departments have their own embedded training, education philosophies, and cultures, but the NSP program will also ask them to agree on the concept, to compromise on divisions of labor among agencies and departments for key mission areas, and to reassign some of their inherent capabilities. This will obviously take an open-minded and nonparochial approach. But it is

easier said than done. For example, even though the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has been legislatively mandated, consider how long it has taken the different Services to embrace and implement its intent and direction fully. They have come a long way, but there are still some who believe it is a work in progress—and after 20-plus years, pockets of nonjointness are alive and well.

Legislation and Enforcement. A Goldwater-Nichols II legislative action has been advocated since before the concept of the NSP was initially discussed. Officers from all Services who have witnessed Goldwater-Nichols' birth, growth spurts, and various levels of acceptance by their respective Services have vast insights as to the pain involved with making jointness work. The Services have cut to the heart of the debate and learned that without legislative action, we would be decades behind in Service coordination. Let us then use the lessons learned from the Goldwater-Nichols maturation process, not repeat them, and immediately put the proposal for legislative action on the table. To rely on "gentlemen's agreements" among interagency participants to coordinate, fund, and provide the high-caliber personnel to make the NSP program work is to ensure the concept's slow failure.

NSP Designation Recognition. The NSP pilot program will graduate its 38 students in June 2008. Will the human resource systems of the various Services, agencies, and departments be ready to identify the newly minted national security professionals and place them in positions using their new skills? Will the various human resources systems have a career track ready for them to ride as they move into the later stages of their careers? Will the various Services, agencies, and departments be ready to provide feedback to the educators as to successes and shortfalls in their respective capabilities? Will they be robust enough to identify and then let their future leaders go away for up to a year to attain their NSP designation? There are many other questions, but the current bet is that the answer to all of them is no.

The silver lining is that the 38 NSP pilot program individuals were selected by their respective Services, agencies, or departments, which implies that these individuals are at least known to be in the program within their parent organizations and that their organizations will be ready to place them in jobs that take advantage of their new knowledge and skills. Another positive sign is that there already is a groundswell of support for the NSP concept within this year's NDU student body, and additional students beyond the initial 38 are attempting to matriculate into the approved NSP electives.

Granted, the NSP concept and pilot program at NDU are an experiment that will take assessment, maturation, and constant feedback from all of its participants. The questions and thoughts in these remarks are only part of the total thought and actions required to move the concept along. The following article paints the picture of where the NSP program stands today, but it should answer many more questions and stir debate. Too much has been said about the problems within the interagency community and how they are not being adequately addressed. The NSP concept is a formative and reasonable start for fixing some of these problems, and it should be given the chance to grow and the resources to succeed.

—RADM Gerard M. Mauer, Jr., USN (Ret.)

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Developing National Security Professionals

By JOHN W. YAEGER



During academic year 2007–2008, the National Defense University (NDU) initiated a new education program for national security professionals (NSPs). This program will educate an interagency cadre of professionals capable of integrating the contributions of individual Government agencies on behalf of larger national security interests. As part of the program, the definition of *national security* includes both traditional national security and homeland security. The pilot program consists of 38 participants selected through their military Service, U.S. Government agency, or department. These students will be the first to receive an array of education and training opportunities as the program expands to developing the careers of NSPs.

With adequate support, NSP education will be recognized as fundamental to senior military and government decisionmakers. However, the success of the pilot program will not be the only criterion used to predict the future of the program. The history of our professional military education system has shown that the future of NSP education will depend predominantly on available resources. To better understand the dynamics of building this education program,

it is valuable to look at the historical context, driving influences, and initial competencies and requirements of NSP education.

Historical Background

In the aftermath of wars, Americans have reformed their system of professional military education with almost ritualistic consistency. Such reforms have usually followed a pattern of change and growth. Conflicts inevitably revealed shortcomings in the performance of the Armed Forces and strengths in the performance of the Nation overall, such as integrated political, military, and economic strategies. These lessons were preserved and improved in an academic environment. Modifications made to professional military education have maintained, refined, and inculcated the lessons learned from each conflict for America's military posterity. Examples of educational institutions created after wars or crises include the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College after the Civil War, the U.S. Army War College following the Spanish-American War, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces after World War I, and the National Defense University following the Vietnam conflict.

The most extensive changes to professional military education occurred following World War II. Serious consideration was given to including more interagency education and synchronizing it with professional military education. The War Department commissioned a major study of officer education.¹ The Commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff School, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, was put in charge of the study board, which became known as the Gerow Board. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasizing the need for joint education, influenced the report. Gerow updated the Joint Chiefs frequently and they, in turn, provided him with feedback.²

The board met in Washington, DC, between January 3 and 12, 1946, and interviewed individuals knowledgeable about joint professional military education. In February 1946, Gerow submitted his board's recommendations to General Dwight Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff. The Gerow Board proposed five joint colleges that would collectively form a National Security University located in Washington and fall under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³ The Industrial College of the Armed Forces already existed, and the board proposed adding the National War College, a joint administrative college, a joint intelligence college, and a Department of State college.⁴ Specifically, the board's report went on to state:

Close and definite coordination is required on the highest military educational level. This should be accomplished by the establishment of a National Security University under the jurisdiction and control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of War (because of his legal responsibility for industrial mobilization). The National Security University will be interested in all problems concerning the military, social and economic resources and foreign policies of the nation that are related to national security.⁵

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U.S. Army

LTG Gerow (seated at right) with (seated) Generals Simpson, Patton, Spaatz, Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges, (standing) Stearley, Vandenberg, Smith, Weyland, and Nugent, about 1945

Gerow’s vision was that graduates of the National Security University would be able to integrate the contributions of their individual agencies on behalf of larger national security interests.

The Gerow report recommended that the Army War College, which suspended operations during World War II, remain closed; that the new National War College occupy the facilities; and that Army War College funding be used for the new college. The proposals for a National Security University and the other colleges were ultimately rejected as a result of limited resources.⁶

the Gerow Board proposed five joint colleges that would collectively form a National Security University

The Armed Forces recognize the value of education and place special emphasis on the importance of professional military education. An officer’s responsibilities and challenges change with each promotion. The education system developed by the military reflects this increasing scope of responsibilities. The Services initially demand competencies from the ensigns and lieutenants in Service-specific weapons. This knowledge broadens to

requirements for strategic-level thinking from the generals and admirals. The lines between the military education and training systems that have evolved over the years have blurred somewhat. Generally, the training programs are highly utilitarian while the educational system, particularly at the senior level, is similar to that of a traditional liberal arts education. There needs to be a similar education system established beyond the Department of Defense to develop national security professionals.

Joint professional military education (JPME) emerged from professional military education. Each professional military education institution had a mission that responded to the need that created it. A side benefit emerged as students from one Service began attending the schools of other Services. That served dual purposes: the Services could work toward solving the Nation’s military and defense problems and, in doing so, could gain a better understanding of each other. There is now a necessity to expand the joint topics, student population, and faculties to appropriately educate NSPs.

The Need for NSP

Reasons for creating professional military education institutions parallel today’s need for more interagency education. Since the Cold War, the national security environment has become more complex. Events such as the

attacks of September 11 highlighted a volatile and uncertain atmosphere with new challenges to the United States. Over time, independent think tanks, the Department of Defense, Congress, and the Bush administration all came to the same conclusion: the United States needs to strengthen interagency operations through training and education.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a nonpartisan Washington think tank, extensively studied U.S. performance in Iraq. One conclusion from the work was that “the mechanisms to integrate efforts across the government were just lacking.”⁷ The number of interagency operations has been increasing, but unfortunately, each crisis has been managed on a case-by-case basis with the wheel being reinvented each time. A year-long CSIS study, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, undertook the challenge of identifying ways to better integrate the disparate parts of the U.S. national security structure so they worked together in planning for and managing crises. One way of achieving better interagency efficiency was through a revised education program.⁸ The late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), proposed converting National Defense University into a National Security University (NSU):

Moving NDU from a DOD [Department of Defense]-focused institution to one addressing the practice and theory of national security for the entire United States government should make it the premier institution focused on “capital J Jointness” or “Super-Jointness.” The new NSU will then be a unique complement to earlier military schooling focused on Service doctrine and “small j” interservice joint operations.⁹

Two months after CSIS published *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, the requirement for improving interagency efforts was further highlighted when Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. gulf coast.

Poor interagency management following Katrina was well documented by the media and thus visible to all of America. For example, a week after Katrina’s landfall, the *Wall Street Journal* drew attention to the poor coordination among Federal departments.¹⁰ The Congressional Research Service prepared a report examining DOD disaster response. Their analysis suggested that the National Response Plan and DOD’s joint homeland security doctrine may have been too “procedure-bound,” with too many decision points and approvals required.¹¹ Conceivably, the crisis could have

been managed much better had there been more interagency training and education.

Congress recognized the need to be proactive. Slightly over 2 weeks following Katrina's landfall, the House of Representatives approved House Resolution 437, creating the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. The final report of the committee repeatedly cited lack of knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities by senior officials as a major impediment.¹² Although the final report did not call for an improved education system to better prepare the interagency community, it is not hard to imagine how training and education could have averted some of the major post-Katrina problems.

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On the same day the House of Representatives approved the resolution, President George W. Bush ordered a comprehensive review of the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina.¹³ Lessons learned emphasized the need for interagency education:

Beyond current plans and doctrine, we require a more systematic and institutional program for homeland security professional development and education. While such a program will center on the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], it should extend to personnel throughout all levels of government having responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural and man-made disasters. For example, DHS should establish a National Homeland Security University (NHSU)—analogous to the National Defense University—for senior homeland security personnel as the capstone for homeland security training and education opportunities. The NHSU, in turn, should integrate homeland security personnel from State and local jurisdictions as well as other Federal departments and agencies.¹⁴

DOD had its own vision of creating something similar to a NHSU. Its plan for interagency education appeared in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR):

The Department will also transform the National Defense University, the Department's premier educational institution, into a true

National Security University. Acknowledging the complexity of the 21st century security environment, this new institution will be tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national security profession. Participation from interagency partners will be increased and the curriculum will be reshaped in ways that are consistent with a unified U.S. Government approach to national security missions, and greater interagency participation will be encouraged.¹⁵

One key Member of Congress was not convinced that transforming NDU into NSU was in the best interest of national security. Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO) expressed his concern in a letter to the Secretary of

Defense. Referring to the QDR, Skelton wrote, "It, therefore, concerns me that this transition to the National Security University might degrade NDU's ability to meet its primary mission—delivering high quality joint professional military education."¹⁶ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, USMC, agreed with Congressman Skelton and declared that NDU will remain NDU. The key was that General Pace clarified that this new education prospectus will not have a negative impact on JPME. National Defense University would not transform into a National Security University but would continue to address the requirement for a new interagency education program.

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell addressed the need for change in an August 2007 article in *Foreign Affairs*. Although he was discussing the need to improve coordination among intelligence agencies, his observations are applicable to all government agencies that have a stake in national security.

The DNI . . . needs to transform the culture of the intelligence community, which is presently characterized by a professional but narrow focus on individual agency missions. Each of the 16 organizations within the intelligence community has unique mandates and competencies. They also have their own cultures and mythologies, but no one agency can be effective on its own. To capture the benefits of collaboration, a new culture must be created for the entire intelligence

community without destroying unique perspectives and capabilities.¹⁷

A key way to change mindsets is through education. One goal of the proposed NSP education would be to understand the cultures and capabilities of other agencies. To improve U.S. national security, strategic leaders need to understand, as McConnell stated, that "no one agency can be effective on its own." The DNI and heads of other agencies recognize the need for a program to support interagency education.

Consortium and Initial Program

A consortium of voluntary members consisting of qualified academic, military, and civilian government centers worked together to create an education program to support the development of NSPs. Consortium participants came from the Department of Homeland Security, Foreign Service Institute (Department of State), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. Institute for Peace, National Defense University, and the Joint Staff (J7). These voluntary consortium members recognized the need for interagency education and were eager to create an interagency academic program. Their preliminary planning defined the basic program structure.

One of the initial challenges in developing an educational curriculum is to identify the attributes of a graduate. The desired qualities have to be further distilled into what characteristics are expected of the students entering the program. With graduate competencies and entrance criteria known, specific learning outcomes of the education can be developed. Subsequent to developing learning outcomes, a delivery method (correspondence, in-residence, online, and so forth) may be identified as well as program length. Accurately established competencies are crucial. If they are wrong, the education will be squandered.

Each government agency has its own set of unique competencies. Identification of common competencies of an NSP is required to establish a foundation for an educational program. A collaborative effort is vital. Fortunately, consortium participants recognized the value of exchanging information to develop the core competencies. An important piece of shared information was the criteria used for selecting senior leaders in different agencies. It turned out that competencies demanded of an admiral are similar to those required of an Ambassador. To achieve core competencies, an

NSP should be a manager of change, culturally aware, a creative thinker, operationally skilled, and technically astute.

From these core competencies, five curricula learning areas were developed:


- national security strategy
- agencies' supporting strategies
- joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities
- national planning systems and processes
- strategic leader development.

The curricula learning areas identified what would be taught, so the next challenge was to decide on how the education would be delivered (for example, in-residence, distributed learning). The consortium decided on a phased approach for implementing the education. Some agencies do not have the latitude within their personnel management systems to send members to various schools. The manpower vacancies while people are in training and education programs need to be carefully planned. Each phase would depend on resources available and measured feedback from the program's outcomes.


One option to address the agreed curricula areas was to explore existing educational programs to see what needs could be met. The first phase for the NSP, or pilot program, was to address the above learning areas and prepare students to analyze at the strategic level the capabilities, organizational cultures, procedures, and roles of U.S. departments and agencies in the planning and conducting of complex operations in peace, crisis, war, and postconflict in overseas and homeland contingencies.

Curricula content is just a third of the challenge. To have a successful education program, students have to arrive with a certain skill set, and the faculty must be capable of effectively teaching content to those students. The senior level joint professional education colleges at NDU were readily positioned to administer the pilot program. Since the student bodies of the National War College (NWC), Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), and the Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JFSC JAWS) already have agency representation, participants for the pilot program were selected from this population. There are 15 students participating in the pilot program at NWC, 15 at ICAF, and 8 at JFSC JAWS.


NWC Class of 2008



ICAF Class of 2008




JFSC JAWS Class of 2008




The NWC and ICAF faculties have interagency representation, and JFSC JAWS is developing a faculty with interagency members.


NWC Faculty AY07/08



ICAF Faculty AY07/08



JFSC JAWS Faculty AY07/08



The 38 students designated by their Services and departments/agencies for the pilot program in academic year 2008–2009 will attend all NWC, ICAF, or JFSC JAWS core courses. To supplement the college core programs, these students will complete a focused electives program, concentrating on planning and implementation of operations within the interagency arena. To measure success, an assessment plan will be designed to ensure that sufficient data are collected to determine whether the NDU NSP graduates meet specific learning outcomes. Each college will survey NSP participants and their supervisors 1 year following graduation in 2009 and again 3 years following graduation to determine how useful the NDU educational experiences were in preparing graduates for the interagency environment. Survey results will be used for broader curriculum revision as well as for input to additional phases of the NSP program. At the same time, the assessment plan will provide the feedback needed to inform NSP education decisions in the future.

The Way Ahead

The NSP pilot program at NDU is a drop in the bucket compared to what is needed for education and training in the interagency environment. President George W. Bush signed a National Security Professional Development Executive Order 13434 on May 17, 2007, which states:

In order to enhance the national security of the United States, including preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters, it is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies.¹⁸

A strategy was developed in response to this executive order. The National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals addresses the substantial challenge of develop-

ing an NSP education system. A national security education board of directors comprised of senior officials of selected Federal departments and agencies will oversee the development. The board will identify existing educational programs that could match the needs of the interagency community.

Although it was not articulated in the strategy, it seems likely that program expansion would include NSP specialty tracks based on the established learning areas. The education component of these specialty tracks could include part-time options, distance learning, interconsortium school transfers, additional professional military education schools, and civilian education institutions. Each component and its students must be constantly assessed to ensure that the component is value-added and meets the needs of the U.S. Government, and that resources are appropriately distributed.

Implementation will be phased as the academic program to support NSP

development is created over many years. As illustrated earlier, professional military education was phased in over time. Professional military education in the United States began with the decision to establish the Military Academy at West Point in 1802 and is still under development. Hopefully, a war will not be needed to highlight requirements to expand NSP education.


Personnel assignments of graduates of these new educational opportunities will be a key indicator of agency and department support for the NSP program. Do they go to school, graduate, and return to their same jobs? With the JPME system, graduate assignments had to be legislated: "At least 50 percent of

all other officers graduating from each joint professional military education school must fill a joint duty assignment as their next duty assignment."¹⁹ The idea behind this directive was to populate the joint jobs with individuals who received a joint education. A concern in Congress was to ensure that officers assigned to joint duty, such as the Joint Staff, had career potential. Prior to this legislation, joint duty had a reputation as a "kiss of death" for one's career. Goldwater-Nichols put pressure on the Services to ensure this did not happen. Will school assignments for agency personnel be seen as a kiss of death or a career enhancement?

Major Challenges

Support is crucial for success. Consortium participation has been voluntary, but Executive Order 13434 identifies many more agencies to participate. The level of backing will become clear when resources need to be identified to execute the program. Manpower, funding, and infrastructure will be important factors in determining the future of the NSP program. Available resources, especially department and agency personnel systems, will probably be the predominant constraint behind implementation. However, the potential exists to leverage the educational resources and talents of each agency to become more efficient and effective. A synergy could be created that currently does not exist. The Armed Forces required congressional direction to become more joint. Legislation may be required for the NSP program to succeed.

As the educational system expands beyond NDU, accreditation will become a more predominant issue. Schools that have accredited programs need to maintain those, while the new program establishes standards. Accreditation is a means of self-regulation and peer review adopted by the civilian educational community. The accrediting process is intended to strengthen and sustain the quality and integrity of higher education. Ultimately, an accredited institution has the confidence of its peer institutions. The intent for accreditation is to obtain the same benefits that civilian higher education institutes have through their accreditation process. Criteria must be developed to ensure credits are transferable and to determine if courses will count toward certificate or degree programs. An accreditation process will validate the adequacy and currency of curricula.



The National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and National Strategy for Homeland Security



Rep. Ike Skelton and Gen Peter Pace talk after NDU change of command ceremony for LtGen Frances Wilson

DOD (D. Mykes Cullen)

Accreditation exposes the third major issue, governance. Who has the final authority over whether a school or program is accredited? How is that person selected? What are the lines of authority? Does the agency or department providing the major source of funding drive consortium governance? If governance is not carefully designed, a collaborative effort could turn toxic. A balance has to be established so the director of the consortium is senior enough yet not *too* senior. A danger exists if someone too high in an organization's structure fails to make time for NSP administration. Since decisions concerning education are not of such a nature that they need immediate attention, the director of the NSP program would inevitably have more pressing business. This lack of priority of issues concerning NSP education could lead to inattention. Will the governing authority be beholden to its parent agency or will it truly be devoted to the mission of NSP development? Governance has the potential to generate considerable friction. The process of determining how this consortium of educational institutions is governed is critical to the success of the program.

Strengthening interagency relationships is vital to improving national security. The potential exists to enhance U.S. national security by creating a program for the development of national security professionals. A robust development program that includes education, training, and professional opportunities promises to increase collaboration among agencies. Educating agency personnel and placing them in jobs where they will use that interagency education will produce a new type of U.S. Government


leadership. Leaders who can analyze at the strategic level; who know the capabilities, organizational cultures, procedures, and roles of U.S. departments and agencies; and who are able to plan and conduct complex operations in peace, crisis, war, and postconflict in overseas and homeland contingencies will be invaluable assets to the Federal Government. To fulfill this potential requires an investment now.

The NSP program calls for a system of education and training opportunities that cover entire careers. The individual military education institutions were not a military education system until Congress became involved. Education did not have the priority to compete for resources before congressional intervention. As agencies struggle with their own internal funding requirements, interagency education will compete with near-term financial and personnel readiness issues. Personnel who receive NSP education and training must be assigned to positions that will make use of their education. The temptation to assign "rising stars" to work on internal agency or department problems must be overcome. The rising stars should not return to their old positions. Promotions need to reflect recognition of interagency experience. As with joint military education, it may take legislation to ensure NSP support from the agencies.

Anticipated program expansion will challenge consortium members and students alike. Expected changes in the NSP program will include modifying the curriculum to reflect current events, changing and adding delivery methods, intensifying professional development requirements, and expanding resources. The way ahead will be filled with emerging challenges. Yet for very little risk there is much to gain. **JFQ**

NOTES

- ¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Chiefs of Staff General Plan for Postwar Education of the Armed Forces," paper presented at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting 962/2.
- ² John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
- ³ Leonard T. Gerow, "Report of War Department Military Education Board on Education System for Officers of the Army," February 1946, 10, Special Collections, National Defense University Library, Washington, DC.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.
- ⁶ Masland and Radway.
- ⁷ Greg Jaffe, "Katrina, Iraq aid efforts hit same hurdles; military officials say crises highlight poor coordination among federal departments," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 7, 2005, A4.
- ⁸ Clark A. Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005).
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.
- ¹⁰ Jaffe.
- ¹¹ Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*, Congressional Research Service report RL33095 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, September 19, 2005), 14.
- ¹² Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, House of Representatives, "A Failure of Initiative," Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Washington, DC, 2006, 1–140.
- ¹³ Frances F. Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006).
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.
- ¹⁵ Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 79.
- ¹⁶ Ike Skelton, Letter to the Honorable Donald L. Rumsfeld, April 4, 2006, Special Collections, National Defense University Library, Washington, DC.
- ¹⁷ Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 44 (July/August 2007), 49.
- ¹⁸ George W. Bush, Executive Order 13434, "National Security Professional Development," May 17, 2007.
- ¹⁹ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P. L. 99–433, chapter 38, section 661.



National Guard Bureau Chief LTG Blum (foreground), President Bush, and Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff inspect Hurricane Katrina recovery mission

U.S. Army (Bob Haskell)