Off the Shelf

Thoughts on Building Joint-Mindedness

By **BRIAN J. HANLEY**

One useful way to advance *joint-mindedness* is to work from a rather eccentric but nonetheless worthy definition of the term. "Acquiring a firm understanding of the other fellow's view of the battlespace" is a good place to start because such a frame of reference illuminates the history and justifies the doctrine and culture of the individual military departments. There are multiple ways to achieve this, but here is a do-it-yourself approach for the joint warfighter that can pay big dividends: read war memoirs written by authors from other branches of Service. The natural sympathy between members of the same profession will stand in relief against the ephemeral circumstances of place, time, and weaponry. Officers who read widely in military autobiography are far more likely to resist parochial outlooks even when they take pride in their own Service traditions and achievements.

What follows is a survey of three memoirs that are not as well known as they should be. What makes these books attractive to junior and midgrade officers in particular is that the authors are their peers. The narratives focus not on the palace intrigue of senior commanders but on the face of battle as experienced by frontline combatants. Hardly less compelling are the lucidity and universality of these accounts.

Retreat from Moscow: The Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne 1812–1813 (London: The Folio Society, 1985) is indispensable to the joint warfighter for a couple of reasons. First, Bourgogne's narrative—written in 1835 but not published in English until 1926—represents one of the earliest memoirs written by a common soldier, universal literacy being largely a product of the 20th century. Second, we find here, as in most accounts written by frontline soldiers, that strategic and operational concerns are remote—for the most part invisible—to the mass of combat troops. Bourgogne's book thus transcends time and place in ways that campaign histories, which are anchored to specific engagements and the guiding hand of individual commanders, cannot. Undoubtedly, Soldiers fighting today in Iraq and Afghanistan will write first-hand accounts of battle that will have far more in common with Bourgogne than might be suggested by the technology they employed or the spot on the earth where they fought.

Bourgogne entered military service in 1805 at the age of 20. Within a few years, he amassed an impressive record, fighting valiantly in Napoleon's campaigns against the Russians, Prussians, and English. In March 1812, he was serving in Portugal when his regiment decamped for Russia. Bourgogne's memoir begins on June 25, 1812, and ends in mid-January 1813, when his regiment—not much more than a collection of bedraggled starvelings—reached Elbing, just beyond the reach of the Cossack cavalry.

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Bourgogne was one of the first troops to enter Moscow on September 14, 1812, but the triumphal atmosphere soon melted away. Five weeks later, Bourgogne's regiment was ordered to deploy outside the city on the pretense that Tsar Alexander, seeking victory by breaking an armistice, ordered a surprise attack on a French cavalry outfit. The reality was that Napoleon had initiated not a counteroffensive but a strategic withdrawal.

There is a grim sameness to the remaining four-fifths of Bourgogne's narrative. He and his fellow soldiers faced the worst possible situation: retreating ill-clad at the onset of a Russian winter, bereft of reliable sources of food, water, shelter, ammunition, and pursued by a savage and resourceful enemy intent on exacting revenge. Within a couple of weeks after leaving Moscow, Bourgogne was forced to survive on the flesh, but more often merely the blood, of worked-to-death horses and whatever other food he could scrounge from the countryside. Lice were constant companions. Marauding Cossack horsemen frequently menaced Napoleon's west-bound troops—though from Bourgogne's descriptions the retreating army must have appeared more like a motley band of battered refugees. Bourgogne spent days on end clinging to groups of stragglers or making his way alone against the snow, frost, and enemy cavalry. Some of the death scenes were horrifyingly ironic. Upon reaching a Prussian village where food and drink were startlingly plentiful, for instance, 1,500 soldiers froze to death, having fallen asleep after binging on spirits and wine. By the end of the narrative, the reader is amazed that Bourgogne survived to write about his experiences.

Joint warfighters will also find much treasure in *Japanese Destroyer Captain* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), Tameichi Hara's memoir of combat in the Pacific during World War II. Most of the book is given over to Hara's experiences as a commander of warships engaged in battle. Readers are not diverted by states of mind and attitudes that do not bear on Hara's duties, nor are they overawed by details strictly of private concern. There is just enough personal commentary to size up Hara's character—always a solid predictor of judgment and behavior—and to assess his reliability as a witness to major events.

Respectful of his samurai heritage, sensibly ambitious, and possessed of a lively intelligence but without the financial means to attend university, Hara was drawn to the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy, where he graduated in 1921. The next two decades were spent at sea, the one exception being an assignment as a surface warfare instructor in 1932.

Hara proved an outstanding tactician, which attracted the esteem of Captain (later Admiral) Chuichi Nagumo. But there were limits as to what the senior officer could do for a protégé. In spite of Nagumo's tutelage, Hara failed the staff college entrance exam, which normally would have derailed any chance for rapid advancement in Japan's peacetime navy. But Hara had no passion for staff work (in fact, he did not make much of an effort to pass the exam), nor was he obsessed with attaining rank. Rather, he wanted a teaching assignment so he could finish rewriting the Imperial Navy's torpedo doctrine, a self-initiated project that had interested him since his initial sea tour. Completed in mid-1932, Hara's doctrinal revisions were accepted by the navy and immediately improved the marksmanship of Japan's destroyer fleet—a circumstance that would contribute to Japan's early surface victories against Allied navies.

This episode illustrates Hara's stout moral and intellectual constitution. He rejected a highly prized staff college slot under the sponsorship of an up-and-coming senior commander and instead chose a path that offered a remote and uncertain payoff. Like all pioneers of military doctrine, but most especially in Hara's case given that he was a junior officer at the time, he took an immense risk by rejecting convention in order

to reform what was regarded as a settled idea. Surprisingly, senior navy leaders—despite being as tradition-bound as one might guess—were persuaded. Hara ended up helping the navy far more than what might have been expected from someone of his rank, position, and relatively narrow experience.

Naval combat between surface ships during World War II may strike the untutored reader as free of many factors that create confusion between the tip of the spear and higher headquarters during land and air combat. At sea, there are no civilians to obstruct the seizure of an objective and no buildings to hide snipers or booby traps. Ship-against-ship battles develop at a snail's pace compared to air-to-air combat between even World War II–era warplanes. Sailors fight under the eye of senior commanders, unlike the front-wave infantry platoon that can choose not to advance or the bomber pilot who jettisons the payload in the face of heavy antiaircraft fire. Even so, Hara's memoir amply demonstrates that fog and friction dominate fighting at sea as much as they do anywhere else.

Few autobiographies published nowadays can compete with the eloquence, clarity, and perceptiveness of Cecil Lewis' memoir, *Sagittarius Rising* (London: The Folio Society, 1998). Aviation enthusiasts will find Lewis' descriptions of flight unforgettable, and certainly this book is a must-read for Eagle Scout students of World War I. Joint warfighters will find the book worthwhile for its depiction of the inaugural integration of airpower into operational campaigns. Lewis is no purveyor of airpower theories, but his narrative illuminates the beginnings of what we now call "air-mindedness." His memoir shows that, from the beginning, air forces could not help but view war radically differently from how it was understood by land forces, even though all of his missions were in support of ground operations. Lewis embodies the aviator spirit that transcends time, place, and doctrine: a breezy indifference to the bounds set by tradition, brashness, recklessness, a trace of whimsy, and an enthusiasm for technical innovation.

When Lewis joined the Royal Flying Corps in the autumn of 1915, the war on the continent had long since reached stalemate. Armies of both camps were exhausted; fighting and disease had thinned ranks by hundreds of thousands. None of this much influenced Lewis' outlook on military service. He had joined because he wanted to fly airplanes. Unlike today, when entry into flight training requires that candidates pass a rigorous mental and physiological screening, Lewis managed to gain a spot simply because he volunteered. His experiences illustrate the aeronautical origins of the term "seat of the pants." Lewis' training was without anything we would recognize as structure. There existed no syllabus, checklists, or International Civil Aviation Organization regulations to master.

Lewis joined a frontline combat unit with a flying time of only 14 hours. He discovered that doctrine was nothing more than a distillation of the experiences of his fellow pilots. Often, Lewis and his squadron mates were assigned missions that they and their equipment were unsuited for, such as flying night patrols to intercept German bombers that attacked London. He handled all these things as well as the unreliability, fragility, and idiosyncrasies of the types of planes he flew allowed, and with marvelous aplomb.

Sagittarius Rising offers an eloquent account of the Great War from an unjustly neglected point of view and also portrays with great skill and artistry the birth of a new weapon. But the book offers more than that. Lewis' memoir embodies the exuberance that in part defines the military aviator's spirit, which lives on in today's air and space expeditionary forces. **JFQ**



Leading at the Speed of Light: New Strategies for U.S. Security in the Information Age
by Daniel M. Gerstein
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006
206 pp. $24.00
ISBN–13: 978–1–59797–060–0

Reviewed by
DANIEL BALTRUSAITIS

Have globalization and the information age changed the basic nature of strategic leadership? Daniel Gerstein argues that the United States is at a critical juncture in history. According to Gerstein, American leaders must be able and willing to respond to the challenges of the information age by developing the structures, organizations, and insights to continue U.S. dominance on the international stage. He critiques the United States for following an industrial-age national security framework when a new structure is required. Unfortunately, his attempt to reformulate the U.S. approach to strategic leadership falls short of hitting the mark by attempting to accomplish too much with too little.

Gerstein opens by arguing that the U.S. security apparatus has failed to meet the challenges of the information age, providing several examples ranging from the war on terror to the response to Hurricane Katrina. However, he fails to address the key causes of these government tribulations: Are they failures of government, or a failure of a particular administration? By not facing the causal patterns of these failures, he misses an opportunity to address the root problem, which he assumes is a systemic failure of leadership. Gerstein proffers a change to the U.S. security apparatus based on this assumption without having convinced the reader that he has identified the endemic problem.

The author next offers a quick—too quick—review of strategy and leadership. In a chapter titled "Lists of Lists," Gerstein examines some common approaches to leadership. In his attempt to condense "the essence of leadership" from multiple vignettes, Gerstein chooses to use the leadership equation developed by Elliott Jaques and Stephen D. Clement in Executive Leadership: A Practical Guide to Managing Complexity (Blackwell Publishing, 1994) to highlight leadership concepts. His selection of this model (which defines ability for leadership as a function of cognitive power, values, skilled use of relevant knowledge, wisdom about people and things, and serious personality/temperament defects) was unusual in that he did not sufficiently argue why that model was more applicable than any other approach to leadership. How does one measure values? Are they as directly relevant as cognitive power? Unfortunately, for an author aiming to change U.S. strategic leadership, Gerstein's review is too broad and shallow. Instead, the reader would gain a greater sense of the challenges of transformational leadership by reading Jack Uldrich's *Soldier, Statesman,*

Peacemaker: Leadership Lessons from George C. Marshall (American Management Association, 2005), or *American Generalship: Character Is Everything: The Art of Command* (Presidio Press, 2000), by Edgar F. Puryear, Jr.

Gerstein is more on the mark in his discussion of globalization, the information age, and their influence on 21st-century leadership, but even that discussion has limitations. He uncovers several interesting insights for leadership in the information age. He argues that the United States is losing wars of ideas because it tends to respond with tools from the physical domain—money and force—rather than ideas and "soft power." He also states that moral leadership is increasingly important because the expectation of privacy and discretion is nearly unrealistic in the CNN world. Finally, he correctly cautions the modern leader on the dangers of the "blizzard of information" inherent in the digital age but fails to offer solutions other than the need for better decision support tools. In contrast, Christopher Lamb and Irving Lachow offer much more useful prescriptions for digital age leadership in issue 43 of *Joint Force Quarterly*. In their article, "Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking," Lamb and Lachow offer an excellent organizational plan to build a decision support cell to improve strategic decisionmaking. *Speed of Light*, on the other hand, lacks such a well-thought-out plan on how to implement an improved leadership approach. Gerstein offers no solution on how to restructure government for the information age other than ordering a congressional review for reorganization. He calls for a congressionally mandated government reorganization similar to the National Security Act of 1947. The reader would expect a more comprehensive plan for government reorganization that goes beyond a mere call for a review of the U.S. national security system.

Gerstein makes interesting arguments regarding the need for strategic changes, but those arguments need more development. He concludes the book with three vital themes for enhancing American security: developing a new U.S. strategy for the information age, establishing a system of national service, and committing to a greater national investment in the promotion of the benefits of globalization. The author's intent was to establish "reach goals" for improving national security rather than attempting to make small marginal changes. Unfortunately, his discussion of these three reach goals could not be adequately covered in the 25 pages devoted to the topic. For example, as part of developing a new strategy for the information age, Gerstein advocates a need for an end-to-end system for consequence management. Although this idea is compelling, the author fails to break out Federal, state, and local responsibilities, nor does he discuss impact of such changes on executive branch power. He falls short in tackling important questions such as the relationship of Federal to state rights. What is the role of a state Governor in a catastrophic condition such as Hurricane Katrina? Do we change the Federal emergency response system completely because Louisiana's hurricane response was inferior to the well-practiced system in Florida?

Overall, *Speed of Light* highlights some interesting ideas on the need for strategic leadership to address the challenges of the information age; however, this work suffers from the lack of development of Gerstein's key concepts and ideas. **JFQ**

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

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat
by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Andrea J. Dew
New York: Columbia University Press, 2006
328 pp. $29.50
ISBN: 0–231–12982–3

Reviewed by
DANIEL McINTOSH

Me and my clan against the world;
Me and my family against my clan;
Me and my brother against my family;
Me against my brother.
—Somali proverb

Shultz and Dew, professors in the Tufts University International Security Studies Program, observe that wars today involve nonstate armed groups—insurgents, terrorists, and militias—with goals and methods different than those of the "modern" soldier. While the conventional soldier is trained for a world of armies and states, he finds himself in battle against tribal warriors, engaged in "primitive warfare."

The authors suggest that the unique characteristics of tribal and clan conflict—founded on cultural notions of prestige, vendetta, revenge, raiding, and glory—should be placed near the center of analysis. "Soldiers and warriors," they argue, "are not the same. They come from different traditions, fight with different tactics, see the role of combat through different eyes, are driven by different motivations, and measure victory and defeat by different yardsticks" (6–7). Therefore, analyses of order of battle and doctrine (concepts that may not even apply to fractured, amorphous, primitive combatants) only make sense in the context of local history. Culture and tradition—norms, values, institutions, customs, and modes of thinking—shape how force will be used, and why.

To structure their analysis, Shultz and Dew suggest a six-factor framework intended to provide a commander with an operational-level assessment of the primitive warrior. The first factor, the "concept of warfare," explores assumptions about the nature of war. Next are "organization and command and control," "areas of operation," and "types and targets of operations." The fifth factor, "constraints and limitations," considers if any codes of conduct regulate the use of force, while the sixth factor, the "role of outside actors," looks to states and nonstate actors and the range of assistance they supply.

The authors are at their best in the difficult process of applying the framework's factors, each simple in the abstract, to case studies. They consider the implications of tribal solidarity based on unilineal descent as well as a weak division of labor that makes every male a de facto warrior. Taken together, these issues are a source of both strength (internal cohesion) and weakness (lack of coordination). Tribes by their nature will remain relatively small, their leaders charismatic, and their coordination nearly impossible—except to fight outsiders. Given these traditions, a successful state built on a tribal society will tend to be authoritarian, a tool for one tribe or clan to dominate the others. Legitimacy will be local, not national. But a perceived

threat from outside, coupled with a rising sense of a transnational obligation in terms of various forms of Islam, enables tribe-based insurgents to work together.

The pattern reoccurs on a smaller scale with clans. Each clan, a subdivision of a tribe, occupies and exploits a tribal region in conjunction with other clans, and problems that a tribe presents to a state are a macrocosm of the problems that clans present to a tribe. Members of a clan trace themselves to a common ancestor and maintain a principle of collective responsibility. Thus the clan, not the law, provides the ground of trust and mutual obligation that make cooperation possible. Clan solidarity provides identity and order, even in the form of transnational networks and criminal groups.

Clans and tribes live in a world of routine violence in which politics is almost entirely zero-sum and where family and God are more important than state or law. To deal with this world, they have developed traditional means to channel and regulate that violence—blood money, vendetta, intermarriage, mediation by elders, limitations on targets—but these methods lose much of their relevance in dealing with outsiders, and in the wake of colonialism and postcolonial anarchy, concepts like jihad are used to justify the expansion of violence to new targets.

These patterns link a series of post-1990 case studies. In Somalia, a clan-based "culture of confrontation" is founded on nomadic traditions. In Afghanistan, identity is linked to conflict: the warrior defines himself in relation to the group that opposes him. Thus, while the anti-Soviet mujahideen differed significantly, there was sufficient common cause to maintain a war of raids and ambushes. In Chechnya, extended patrimonial families continue to celebrate violence and warrior skills as integral to the way of life. There, as in Afghanistan, whatever limits on violence existed disappeared in opposition to Soviet brutality. In Iraq, the "mystique of the raid" predates the state-tribalism of Saddam and continues to influence the various elements of the insurgency.

Building on the cases, Shultz and Dew find there are cultural, as well as logistical, reasons why primitive warrior units will be small and organized by tribe and region and will operate through ambush and raid. They also find that traditional methods adapt well to the urban battlefield, and over time, one should expect traditional limits on violence (especially when directed against outsiders) to weaken. Finally, outside actors have pushed to continue and expand the violence. The multiple case study approach illuminates the transnational networks that link and educate clans, to see how Chechens, for example, trained and fought in Afghanistan, other Afghan veterans brought their lessons to Somalia, and foreign Islamists in Iraq were the first to ignore traditional limits on violence.

Shultz and Dew propose that an awareness of how tribes and clans operate creates opportunities for the soldier. The American invasion of Afghanistan, for example, is hailed as an illustration of how understanding the culture multiplies combat power, while the results in Iraq are presented as what happens when one makes plans without a sense of how local culture works. They push the reader to consider that the "primitive" enemy has a logic of his own that can be anticipated and used against him. They show that while the logic of clan violence is not the only factor to consider, it is one we ignore at our peril. **JFQ**

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

Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions
by Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Karl P. Mueller
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006
204 pp. $25.00
ISBN: 978–0–8330–3963–7

Reviewed by
EDWARD B. WESTERMANN

Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era delivers far more than the title implies. In the best tradition of RAND studies, this work combines theory, model development, and policy applications for developing counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy writ large and for improving U.S. Air Force COIN capabilities specifically.

The first half of the study analyzes the emerging strategic environment and examines the nature and importance of contemporary insurgencies, especially those being leveraged by global jihadists, to U.S. national security interests. The authors correctly place the issue of military counterinsurgency strategy within the larger framework of grand strategy involving political, diplomatic, social, economic, and law enforcement efforts. While stressing the essentially political nature of COIN, the authors argue that the nature and extent of the U.S. military response requires a cost-benefit analysis based on the level of risk and expense tied to the probability of success. With respect to military means, they argue: "The most effective means for the U.S. military to contribute to the defeat of insurgencies is indirectly, through advisory and training missions" (146).

With respect to model development, the work provides a useful dual typology for describing COIN strategy: a precautionary approach or a remedial approach. In the case of the former, early detection and timely intervention provide the keys to preventing nascent insurgencies from evolving into movements threatening regime stability. If an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure, then the cases of the recent Georgia Train and Equip program and the U.S. effort in El Salvador in the 1980s offer cost-effective options that allowed host governments to effectively marginalize or defeat insurgent groups, obviating the requirement for large-scale U.S. involvement. In cases of established insurgencies, the remedial strategy draws on a true interagency approach incorporating phased or graduated military responses ranging from training and advisory functions to the participation of forces in direct

combat operations, as exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The second half of the work focuses on the employment and efficacy of airpower assets in the counterinsurgency role and provides recommendations for senior Air Force leaders for enhancing Service COIN capabilities. Above all, the authors insist that "COIN be treated as a problem as important as conventional warfighting even though the manpower, dollars, and force structure devoted to it will likely never need to be as large as that devoted to major combat operations" (xii–xiii). In truth, this assertion constitutes a major challenge for a Service that historically has seen the air advisory and training function as little more than a sideshow to the main effort. Within the U.S. Air Force, the air advisory mission has benefited from tepid rhetorical and minimal materiel support at best, and, at worst, has suffered from outright neglect.

According to the authors, the "single most effective means" for reversing the traditional neglect of this mission and expanding USAF expertise involves "the creation of a wing size organization dedicated to aviation advising" (136). In addition, the study advocates personnel initiatives designed to identify, train, and promote officers and noncommissioned officers who choose the air advisory career path. However, the fundamental challenge involved in creating a robust air advisory capability centers less on specific organizational initiatives than on the creation of a new institutional mindset among the senior leadership. As Stephen Rosen highlights in *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), military innovation requires advocates within the senior flag ranks of the affected Service. Indeed, the U.S. Army's adoption of the airmobile concept in the 1960s provides an apt model for the current Air Force air advisory effort. The creation of the Army's air mobility capability resulted from the patronage and support of Generals James Gavin and Hamilton Howze, the transfer of "blue chip" or "fast burner" colonels from the traditional combat branches into the new combat arm, and the promise of promotion opportunities for mid-career and junior officers. Similarly, the creation of a viable and effective U.S. Air Force air advisory mission will require all of these steps along with the investment of substantial financial resources from a limited budget.

Air Power and the New Counterinsurgency Era is a work of critical importance for Air Force senior leadership and the rank and file. It offers a prescient analysis of COIN warfare and strategy and provides trenchant recommendations for enhancing the Service's capability in the long war against Islamic extremism. In the end, however, Service priorities determine resource commitments, and it remains to be seen if the U.S. Air Force will invest in an air advisory ounce of prevention or remain wedded to a conventionally based pound of cure. **JFQ**

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INSS Special Report

Moving the U.S.-ROK Alliance into the 21st Century

In 2005, the United States and South Korea launched the Strategic Policy Initiative, a cooperative effort for updating the alliance to meet the security threats of the post-9/11 world. In support of this initiative, an advisory group authored this report, which finds that the key issue facing the alliance is the strategic dissonance regarding North Korea. The group recommends alliance transformation as the best option for transferring wartime operational control, strengthening the alliance politically, opening new avenues for security cooperation, and contributing to a peaceful Asia-Pacific.

Strategic Forum 229

The European Union: Measuring Counterterrorism Cooperation

David T. Armitage, Jr., notes the difficulty of cooperation between the United States and the European Union (EU) in the war on terror. The governments of the 27 EU countries maintain separate counterterrorism policies, but the threat crosses borders and sectors. Although the major terrorist attacks in Europe have been against transportation infrastructure, information systems, energy networks, and food supplies are vulnerable. Armitage recommends a multilevel, multisectored approach by which the United States continues to pursue avenues of cooperation at the national, EU, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization levels.

Strategic Forum 228

Trans-American Security: What's Missing?

The countries of the Western Hemisphere are more integrated than ever, but relationships remain hampered by outdated patterns and stereotypes while nontraditional issues are arising. Luigi Einaudi argues that the United States needs to rethink hemispheric cooperation. He recommends several ways in which Washington can help renew trans-American security cooperation: implementing inter-American laws already signed by the United States; building civilian institutions critical to stability; developing professional skills and key institutional relationships; and improving policy dialogues and interministerial consultations.

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